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Abstract 
 
The New Zealand telecommunications experience illustrates the process of competition 
in a market for network services, characterised by technological change and minimal 
regulation. The story of free ISPs is merely one episode in the battle of Telecom and 
Clear for the New Zealand telecommunications market. It was enabled by a complex 
combination of regulation, contractual choices and an unanticipated surge of the Internet. 
Despite certain static inefficiencies, the free ISPs have brought a considerable number of 
dynamic efficiencies that should be taken into account when evaluating New Zealand’s 
light-handed policy regime in this industry.  
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1 Introduction 
 
During the 1990’s the face of communication was changed with the advent of new 
technology providing new uses, as well as different applications of old uses (eg voice 
communication). The growth of the Internet, in particular, between 1994 and 1999 took 
many players by surprise. Internet growth has shown a pattern of at least doubling traffic 
each year1. These changes increased competition and a need for networks to interact. 
Such has been the speed of change that its effect was not for any player to anticipate. The 
free Internet Service Provider (ISP) in New Zealand is an example of the dynamics at 
work in the telecommunications industry. Essentially an episode in the battle of the 
Telcos2, the free ISP tells the story of regulatory constraints and contractual choices in a 
rapidly changing technological environment. 
 
As the free ISP model has had a serious impact on the demand for Internet services and is 
likely to have affected competition in the PSTN3 market, it is most useful to have a closer 
look at the development of this model and analyse its exact implications. By not only 
studying economic theory but also analysing the free ISP experience in the OECD’s first 
member country to fully deregulate its telecommunication market, i.e. New Zealand, we 
can gain insight in the model and learn valuable lessens about dynamics in lightly 
regulated industries in general and telecommunications in particular. Section 2 gives a 
short history overview of the developments in New Zealand. 
 
Several theories about free ISPs have been advanced. An often-heard explanation for the 
existence of free ISPs is based on the revenues stemming from advertising and sales 
commissions from online commerce. While these revenue sources do indeed explain the 
existence of free ISPs in the United States and Australia, they cannot account for the 
emergence of free ISPs in New Zealand in the course of 2000. Theories much more 
applicable to the New Zealand situation argue that interconnection charges between 
telecommunications operators are the main source of revenue for free ISPs. Much of the 
                                                          
1 Claims of doubling traffic every three to four months were frequently heard over the two-year period 
1995-6. See Coffman and Odlyzko (2001). 
2 “Telcos” is a term often used (especially in the media) to indicate telecommunications operators. 
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literature on this topic has been based on the work of Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998). The 
main idea is that, as free ISPs generate much extra one-way traffic from one network to 
another, they generate extra termination revenues for the network they are operating on. 
This in turn will give the telecommunication operator who owns the network an incentive 
to stimulate the existence of free ISPs by offering them part of the extra revenues. These 
and other explanations for the development of free ISPs derived from economic theory 
are elaborated in Section 3. 
 
The fact that New Zealand is the first OECD member that fully deregulated its 
telecommunications industry and that it is a country in which free ISPs have emerged, 
(shortly) lived, and gone out of business again, makes it the perfect case study to analyse 
the development and implications of the free ISP market. In order to fully understand the 
chain of events that occurred within the telecommunications industry in general, and the 
free ISP market in particular, it is of great importance to understand the New Zealand 
specific circumstances.  Section 4 analyses the New Zealand case from a strategic point 
of view against the background of New Zealand’s regulatory environment. First, it looks 
at the information asymmetries faced by the two major telecommunications operators  
(Telecom and Clear) and the contractual choices that followed. It then studies the impact 
of the Kiwi Share Obligations and the legal uncertainty stemming from New Zealand’s 
competition policy on those choices, and explains the emergence of free ISPs from there. 
Taking a closer look at the relevant market structure and the conduct of its main players 
reveals that the emergence of free ISPs in New Zealand was merely an episode in the 
battle of the Telcos.  
 
To understand the possible implications of free Internet access, it is necessary to analyse 
performance data including customer numbers, Internet usage, and market consolidation. 
In addition, both static and dynamic efficiency effects need to be assessed and compared. 
Section 5 takes a closer look at the required data, analyses the various efficiency effects, 
and examines the possible implications of free ISPs in New Zealand (and to a certain 
extent in other countries). Finally, based on the information gathered throughout Sections 
                                                                                                                                                                             
3 Public Switched Telephone Network. 
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3, 4, and 5, Section 6 draws conclusions on the development and implications of free ISPs 
in general, and free ISPs in New Zealand in particular. 
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2 Historical overview of the ISP market in New Zealand  
 
In order to draw an accurate picture of the development of free ISPs in New Zealand, we 
first need to take a closer look at the context in which it took place. This historical 
overview will first give a general description of the New Zealand telecommunications 
industry, including a detailed illustration of the ISP market and the interconnection 
dispute between Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd (Telecom) and Clear 
Communications Ltd (Clear). Building on Enright (2000), we can distinguish four 
different stages in the development of Internet growth in general, and ISPs in particular, 
in New Zealand until 1999. Data on key events in the evolution of ISPs from 1999 
onward is based on a publication of the New Zealand Ministry of Economic 
Development (2001) and various news archives. As we are particularly interested in the 
free ISPs, the first of which emerged in February 2000, we will focus on the latter 
period4. 
 
2.1 Impression of the New Zealand telecommunications industry 
2.1.1 Recent history of the telecommunications industry  
In the late 1970s and early 1980s New Zealand's economic management and performance 
was increasingly criticised. A period of economic reform followed that focused on the 
removal of protection and the development of competitive markets. The New Zealand 
Government at that time was of the opinion that private ownership could provide a better 
ongoing basis for the efficient operation of enterprises in industries as 
telecommunications, airlines, railway and banking. Specifically, the aim for the 
telecommunications industry was: “[…] to improve the industry's economic performance 
and increase consumer benefits by creating competitive, open entry telecommunications 
markets supported by general competition law”5. The result was that in 1987 the New 
Zealand Post Office – which until then had had a statutory monopoly in the provision of 
public telecommunications services in New Zealand - was split up into Telecom 
Corporation of New Zealand Ltd (Telecom), Post Office Bank Ltd, and New Zealand 
Post Ltd. Telecom was privatized in 1990, when it was sold to wholly owned subsidiaries 
                                                          
4 For an extensive overview of the history of Internet growth in New Zealand, see Enright (2000). 
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of Bell Atlantic Corporation and Ameritech Corporation for NZ$4,250 million. A year 
later, it issued shares to the public and was listed on the New Zealand, Australian and 
New York stock exchanges6.  
 
2.1.2 Regulation 
On 1 April 1989 New Zealand became the first member of the OECD to introduce full 
competition to all sectors of the telecommunications industry. According to the Ministry 
of Commerce (1995), the Government opted for a light-handed regulatory regime that 
relied, for enforcement, upon private legal actions together with a generic competition 
law enforcement body. Specifically, the regime relied upon private negotiations between 
competitors of the integrated natural monopoly to secure interconnection agreements 
subject to existing competition policy, in particular the 1986 Commerce Act. The 
Commerce Act established the Commerce Commission and provided New Zealand with 
regulation on restrictive trade practices, mergers and takeovers, and price controls. 
Important sections for the purpose of our analysis are S.27, that prohibits contracts, 
arrangements, or understandings that substantially lessen competition, and especially 
S.36, which up till 2001 dealt with so-called use of dominant positions (see Appendix B). 
 
The Kiwi Share Obligations are a contractual agreement between the Crown and 
Telecom, established when Telecom was privatized in 19907. According to the 1990 Kiwi 
Share Obligations, Telecom was required to: 
• Maintain a local free calling option for ordinary residential telephone service; 
• Charge no more than the standard residential rental for ordinary residential 
telephone service; and  
• Continue to make ordinary residential telephone service as widely available as at 
1 November 1989. 
 
Until 2001, the telecommunications industry did not have an industry-specific regulator. 
The advantages were thought to be cost savings, allowing concentration of expertise in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
5 Ministry of Economic Development (2001). 
6 Telecom (2002). 
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the Commerce Commission, and allowing the development of precedents through the 
Court system, thereby promoting consistency of approach between industries. The 1987 
Telecommunications Act only provided for regulations concerning information disclosure 
and international services, as well as access to land and cable facilities.  
 
2.1.3 The Clear / Telecom dispute and interconnection agreements 
Clear entered the market for long-distance calls in 1991, when it experienced few 
difficulties in entering into an interconnection agreement with Telecom, and eventually 
succeeded in capturing approximately 20 percent of that market8. However, entry to the 
local call market was more complicated because Clear and Telecom could not agree on 
interconnection terms. Eventually, after several attempts to negotiate an interconnection 
agreement with Telecom and in the absence of an industry-specific regulator, Clear 
addressed the High Court of New Zealand, alleging that Telecom’s pricing demands 
breached S.36 of the Commerce Act. Telecom’s main defence for its demanded access 
prices was the Baumol-Willig rule or the Efficient Component Pricing Rule, which said 
doing so was economically efficient9. This required Clear to pay the full opportunity cost 
of traffic taken from Telecom, including foregone profit.   
 
In December 1992, the High Court held that the interconnection terms finally offered by 
Telecom did not breach S.36, adding that the disputed interconnection pricing rule was 
more likely than the alternatives to improve efficient competition in New Zealand 
telecommunications. A year later, the Court of Appeal revised this decision and ruled in 
Clear’s favour, stating that Telecom could not lawfully charge an interconnection price 
that included a component of monopoly rents. Telecom in turn appealed to New 
Zealand’s final appellate Court, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which 
released its decision in October 1994. It concluded that use of the Baumol-Willig rule by 
Telecom was not unlawful under S.36 of the Commerce Act and would allow Clear to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
7 Ministry of Economic Development (2001) 
8 Carter and Wright (1999). 
9 The Efficient Component Pricing Rule states that the appropriate access charge by the bottleneck 
monopolist to the providers (actual or potential) of a complementary product or service, which the 
monopolist also produces (and thus the other providers are rivals to the monopolist), is a fee equal to the 
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compete out over time any monopoly profit obtained by Telecom. In addition, it held that 
Telecom was not acting anti-competitively and that it had not been established by Clear 
that it had been prevented from entering the market. Telecom and Clear finally signed an 
interconnection agreement in March 1996. The agreed interconnection charges were the 
following: 
• Clear would pay Telecom 2 cents per minute for each local call originated on 
Clear’s network terminated by Telecom; 
• Telecom would pay 1 cent per minute (rising gradually to 2 cents per minute by 
the year 2000) for each local call originated on Telecom’s network terminated by 
Clear; 
• There would be a 75 percent discount for off-peak calls; and 
• Clear would pay Telecom an additional charge of 1 cent per minute10. 
 
According to Telecom: “[…]The Telecom/Clear 1996 ICA was used as a starting point 
for later agreements, and the pricing clause for local interconnect call termination was 
repeated in other agreements” 11. Specifically, the agreements with Telstra (Nov. 1996), 
Saturn (June 1997), and Compass (Sept. 1998) concerned local interconnect traffic.  
Typical local telephone interconnection charges charged by other providers to Telecom 
usually looked like the following schedule, which is comparable to the charges agreed 
upon between Telecom and Clear.  
 
Shortly after signing the interconnection agreement with Telecom, however, Clear 
contended that Telecom’s volume toll discounts were in breach of S.36 (use of 
dominance12) in the Commerce Act. According to the New Zealand Herald, Clear held 
approximately 15 percent of amounts due since February 1997, which exceeded $20 
million mid-1999 and an alleged $30 million at the time the new interconnection 
                                                                                                                                                                             
monopolist’s opportunity costs of providing the access, including the foregone revenues from a 
concomitant reduction in the monopolist’s sales of the complementary component. Economides (1995).  
10 These additional charges were described as ‘costs incurred because of the Kiwi Share requirements’ by 
Clear and as ‘a contribution to fixed and common costs of the Telecom local network’ by Telecom. 
11 Telecom (2002). 
12 See Appendix B. 
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agreements were signed (October 2000). In 1998, the Court of Appeal reaffirmed that 
Clear could withhold payments until judgment was delivered13. 
 
FIGURE 2.1 INTERCONNECTION CHARGES CHARGED TO TELECOM14 IN 1998 
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2.1.4 The 0867 access package 
In August 1999, Telecom introduced its 0867 access package, in o
Internet traffic from traditional voice calls in order to improve the netw
of Internet traffic”15. As implemented, it entailed three facets16: 
1. establishing an identifying number code for Internet users (0867 
2. encouraging users to migrate to this code by charging per minut
free monthly access for seven-digit number calls; and 
3. excluding 0867 calls from the interconnect termination payments
There was (and still is) disagreement about the legality of Telecom’s 0
Section 4.3). Finally, in May 2000, Telecom and Clear reached an agree
Internet number range. The Commerce Commission is still pursuing a c
Telecom for its 0867 access package. 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 The New Zealand Herald (1999). 
14 Note that some interconnection agreements were for shorter terms, i.e. less than 5 ye
15 Telecom (1999). 
16 New Zealand Institute of Economic Research (2000). 
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2.2 An illustration of the ISP market 
An Internet Service Provider is defined as an entity that provides access to the Internet as 
its primary function. Internet access services are very similar to the more traditional 
telephone and data communication services provided by telecommunication service 
providers17. Basically, ISPs sell Internet access and other related telecommunications 
services through bandwidth leased from a data communication network – in New 
Zealand, that could be Telecom, Clear, Saturn, or other providers. They then repackage 
this into amounts usable by individuals and companies. Hence, Internet access through 
either dial-up or high-speed data connections is a repackaging of the leased bandwidth, 
and has become a sub-market within the telecommunications industry.  
 
The ISP market structure is characterized by a high degree of contestability, low 
switching costs for consumers, and a low degree of product differentiation. According to 
Enright (2000), the ISP market has low barriers to entry, as all that is required to start an 
ISP company is an Internet server ($5,000 to $20,000) and leased bandwidth. In addition, 
it is easy to adjust costs as required, since the leased service can be paid for monthly. We 
would therefore expect many competitors in the market, which is indeed confirmed by 
the data in Enright (2000). Switching costs for consumers are low, as changing ISPs only 
requires the customer to pay a connection fee to the new ISP, obtain a new email address 
and install some new software. It should be noted that switching costs may be higher for 
some business customers due to the inconvenience of changing email addresses, but this 
may be avoided by purchasing a domain name. Finally, there appears to be little product 
differentiation. Even though services can be differentiated in response to the needs of 
customers (different price levels for a different degree of speed of operation, consistency 
of access, technical support etc.), most ISPs offer roughly the same Internet access 
packages, reflecting the fact that ISPs are the conduits for communication, not the 
originators of demand. 
 
Figure 2.2 shows the relations between the various actors involved in the provision of 
Internet access, applied to the New Zealand market. The basic idea was that an end user 
                                                          
17 Enright (2000). 
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called in from the Telecom network, after which the call was redirected to the ISP of 
choice. Calls of Xtra customers could be redirected within the Telecom network (as Xtra 
operates on the Telecom network), whereas calls to ISPs operating on other networks first 
had to be transferred to those networks before they could be redirected to the appropriate 
ISP. Here lies the main source of revenue for ISPs operating on other networks than 
Telecom’s. It is agreed upon in interconnection agreements between operators in the 
telecommunication industry that the operator who terminates a call that originated on 
another network charges this other network for terminating that call. As New Zealand’s 
telecommunication regulations require Telecom to offer free residential local calls, most 
calls tend to originate on the Telecom network. This gave other operators like Clear and 
Saturn the incentive to stimulate ISPs operating on their networks because they would 
generate much one-way traffic originating on the Telecom network for which Clear and 
Saturn could charge termination payments. Most ISPs operated on either one of these two 
networks and signed contracts with them that determined they (the ISPs) got part of the 
termination revenue per minute of generated traffic.  
 
Another possible source of revenue stems from online advertising and sales commissions 
through email, homepages, portals and similar services. However, as these activities do 
not belong to the core business of ISPs (providing Internet access) and mainly depend on 
web browser and email applications and demand for such services (that the ISPs 
themselves cannot influence), they are unlikely to account for the bulk of ISP revenues 
unless a substantial critical mass is reached – something which is not likely to happen in  
New Zealand because of its small population. 
 
The 0867 access package basically tried to force ISPs to buy a 0867 number from 
Telecom, that their customers had to call in order to reach them (line “0867 (1)” in 
Figure 2.1). Either by negotiations with other operators on the issue (Clear and Telecom 
reached an agreement in May 2000) or by direct compensation offers (an alleged 
compensation payment was made to Ihug18), Telecom tried to transfer all data traffic to
                                                          
18 The Internet Society of New Zealand (2000). 
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FIGURE 2.2 BASIC TERMINATION MODEL APPLIED TO THE NEW ZEALAND CASE 
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their 0867 number range. However, because the ISPs had interconnection agreements 
with Clear and Saturn and consequently operated on their networks, the calls to the ISPs 
had to be forwarded to those networks first before they could finally be redirected to the 
appropriate ISP (line “0867 (2)” in Figure 2.1). Although the 0867 package may be 
legally controversial, in terms of competition law, it has enabled analysts to study data 
traffic and voice traffic separately. This puts New Zealand in a unique position, as most 
other countries, including the United States, cannot differentiate between voice and data 
traffic because there is no special number range for data traffic and all calls use the same 
telephone lines. The learning effects from the New Zealand experience may therefore be 
of wide interest and applicability.  
 
2.3 Chronological overview of key events in the ISP market 
2.3.1 The period 1987 - 1999 
The period marked as Stage 0 by Enright represents the pre-commercialisation era, in 
which mainly academics and hobbyists accessed the Internet. Universities, polytechnics, 
and co-operatives were principally motivated by the need to provide Internet access for 
their staff and students or other community members. Internet services in New Zealand 
were also provided by offshore organisations like Microsoft, CompuServe, IBM Global 
Networks and Voyager19. Enright (2000) reports price competition wasn’t fierce at that 
time. Instead, most variation was due to differentiation based on service. Demand for 
Internet service through this period was small but growing steadily.  
 
Stage 1 describes the period between mid-1996 and December 1997, characterised by the 
commercialisation of the Internet. At the start of 1996, there were more than 30 ISPs in 
New Zealand, most of which served regional markets while Voyager, CompuServe and 
IBM served the national market. Commercialisation led to increased price competition, 
which was strengthened by the entrance of Xtra in May 1996. Xtra, launched by New 
Zealand’s largest telecommunications operator Telecom, could benefit from economies 
of scale and scope and was able to cut its rates by 50% in August 1996 and its 0800 
                                                          
19 Voyager was started as a joint venture between OzEmail and two New Zealand entrepreneurs, with 
OzEmail providing most of the Internet access expertise (it has the second largest subscriber base in 
Australia. Currently, OzEmail owns 100% of Voyager. 
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access prices to $1/hr below Voyager. Consequentially, many smaller regional ISPs 
exited the market and the ones that were able to maintain their presence faced heavily 
declining market shares: these include IBM and CompuServe, who started concentrating 
on the business customer segment. In November 1996, Clear Communications, New 
Zealand’s second largest telecommunications service provider, launched its own ISP, 
called ClearNet. Although also benefiting from economies of scale and scope, ClearNet 
had a different approach than Xtra, initially focussing on large business customers and 
basing its pricing strategy on peak service demand times. Around the time of Xtra’s 
entry, iHug was the first ISP to offer a flat rate service, backed by bandwidth it had 
obtained from sources outside of New Zealand. 
 
Stage 2 covers the year 1998, which appeared to be a period of supply-side stability – 
both in terms of prices and market entry/exit. However, because of a growing awareness 
of the possibilities the Internet had to offer, demand for Internet services grew by over 
100% in the same period! While users were broadly segmented into residential and 
business customers, most ISPs could be distinguished as either ‘generalists’ (Xtra, 
Clearnet, and Voager) or ‘nichers’ (most regional ISPs as well as iHug, NetLink and 
Actrix). Ihug’s strategy of expanding, reducing cost, and concentrating on heavy users 
resulted in being the third largest service in the country. 
 
After that period of stability, Stage 3 (1999) showed another increase in competition, with 
incumbents aggressively seeking to maintain their relative position. A general move away 
from time-billing towards offering flat rate Internet services led to increased Internet use. 
ClearNet introduced flat rate Internet services in June 1999, ParadiseNet (through Saturn) 
followed in July. In the same period, Ihug reduced its (monthly) flat rate from $45 to 
$39.50 in response to Xtra’s price announcement. During the entire period covered, i.e. 
from 1996 till 1999, user prices of Internet access decreased substantially. To illustrate, 
the monthly price for a mid-range user decreased from somewhere between $110 and 
$150 at the beginning of 1996 to approximately $30 at the end of 199920.  
                                                          
20 A mid-range user uses 20 hours per month of connection and downloads 100Mb of international traffic, 
50% at peak usage. This characterizes either a heavy residential user or a small business. In contrast, a low-
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2.3.2 2000: Free Internet access is born 
The first free ISP in New Zealand was Freenet, launched in February 2000 by Compass 
Communications, who invested $1 million setting up the service. Although the free 
Internet access was restricted to a maximum of ten hours a month, Freenet was quite a 
success initially, as 10,000 new customers signed up in the first four weeks, a number 
which was doubled by April 2000. The offer entailed paying $1.50 per hour after those 
ten free hours or a $19.95 flat rate for 300 hours a month, no joining fees, and the 
promise of no advertisement-overload as was the case with many free services already 
operating in Australia and the United States. According to The New Zealand Herald 
(2000a), Freenet was clearly targeting existing rather than new Internet users. 
 
Two months later in April 2000, i4free – a venture backed by National Mail director Paul 
Meier, Attica Communications director Wayne Toddun, and CallPlus director Malcolm 
Dick - was launched, residing on Clear’s network. I4free was in fact the first ISP to offer 
unlimited free Internet access. In contrast to Freenet, it said it aimed to finance its 
business through advertising revenue and commissions from online sales21, an approach 
that seemed to be successful for quite a few booming free ISPs in Australia and the 
United States (see §3.1). Shortly after, Telstra Saturn purchased ISP ParadiseNet Limited, 
which at the time had about 33,000 subscribers throughout New Zealand, mostly 
residential. Also in April, ISP Surf4nix was launched on Telecom’s network. In that same 
month, the Government announced that the Commerce Act 1986 would be 
strengthened22.  
 
In May that year, Telecom and Clear reached an agreement on the 0867 Internet number 
range. Another interconnect agreement was announced in July, between Telstra Saturn 
and Telecom. Subjects of agreement were wholesale services, 0867 Internet traffic and 
pole-sharing. According to the Ministry of Economic Development (2001), a key feature 
                                                                                                                                                                             
end user only consumes 10 hours, downloads 20Mb all at peak usage times, and a high-end user uses 50 
hours, downloads 500Mb, 20% at peak usage. See Enright (2000). 
21 The New Zealand Herald (2000b). 
22 An important part of the changes was that the phrase “dominance” in Section 36 of the Act would be 
replaced with the lower threshold of “a substantial degree of power in a market” and that the word “use” 
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of this agreement was the introduction of a form of “bill and keep” arrangement for local 
interconnection, which implied different operators would only bill their own customers 
and not pay each other any termination charges for ISP-bound calls as long as the two-
way traffic was reasonably balanced. More importantly, calls to ISPs were now 
considered ‘call-sinks’ for which no termination charges had to be paid (see §4.4).  
September 2000 saw a new wave of price decreases with Clear announcing its new flat-
rate access to the Internet for $24.95 per month after Xtra had announced it intended to 
do the same (iHug had been offering this new flat rate deal for several months already)23.  
October 2000 is the month in which the final report from the Ministerial Inquiry into 
Telecommunications was released. The inquiry recommended a single regulatory 
framework covering all electronic communication services, the designation of 
interconnection with Telecom’s fixed wire network, specification of interconnection 
between all networks, and the application of access objectives to assess whether 
specification or designation of a service was desirable. Clear and Telecom reached a new 
interconnection agreement, also including so-called “bill-and-keep” and “callsink” 
provisions (see Section 4.4). Shortly after, Clear’s Zfree (then the largest free Internet 
provider) announced it had reached 250,000 registered users and had to suspend new 
registrations to ensure Zfree’s quality was maintained.  
 
2.3.3 End 2000 – Mid-2002: The end of free Internet access 
Surf4nix ceased trading in November 2000, and advised its 2,500 subscribers in 
Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and Hamilton to switch to i4free’s service. However, 
shortly after Zfree’s announcement, i4free also warned customers that its quality of 
service would continue to deteriorate unless they joined its new pay service. It had 
reached 145,000 subscribers at that time24. Another free ISP, Splurge (with a customer 
base of just 5,000 in the Auckland region only), began charging for its services in April 
2001. In May, The New Zealand Herald reported: “New Zealanders’ access to free 
                                                                                                                                                                             
was to be replaced with  “take advantage of”. These changes would bring New Zealand competition policy 
on dominance more in accordance with Australia’s policy, which was already using that terminology.   
23 Ministry of Economic Development (2001) 
24 Internetnews.com (2001). 
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Internet services has been dealt another body blow”25. ISP Freenet had, after having 
offered unlimited free internet access, cut down its offer back to the initial ten hours in 
January and subsequently back to 3.5 hours a month in May. Customers that wanted to 
spend more time online had to pay a monthly charge of $14.75. Out of the approximately 
50,000 users that had signed up for the free service, between 15,000 and 20,000 had 
switched over to the limited service. At this time, the Telecommunications Bill, 
containing the legislation to implement the new telecommunications regulatory regime, 
was introduced to Parliament. The resulting Telecommunications Act was passed in 
December of that year. Rumours about the country’s last remaining free ISP, Zfree, 
having to shut down were already circulating in February 2002, perhaps mistakenly based 
on technical problems with international bandwith26. Either way, the trend in the free ISP 
market could not be misinterpreted: the average free ISP was not to live a long and 
prosperous life. Zfree had to cease its business in July 2002 and its customers were 
redirected to Clearnet. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25 The New Zealand Herald (2001). 
26 The New Zealand Herald (2002a). 
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3 Explanations for the existence of free ISPs 
 
To get a better understanding of the development of free ISPs in general and the ones in 
New Zealand in particular, we need to take a closer look at their foundations. We now 
know how and when they emerged, but perhaps a more interesting question is why they 
entered the world of telecommunications. The obvious answer to the question why any 
business enters an industry is of course to generate supra-normal profits that are believed 
to be ‘out there’, either now or in the (direct) future. But how can anyone make a profit 
out of giving away Internet access for free? Our analysis will outline a number of 
important possible profit sources that have attracted / may attract free ISPs. Section 1 will 
discuss the business model explanation for the existence of free ISPs, which is the 
possibility to generate revenue from online advertising and e-commerce. Section 2 will 
then use the model of Laffont et al (1998a) to set out how ISPs can generate revenue from 
terminating calls, which seems to have been the main reason for the development of free 
ISPs in New Zealand. For the purpose of completeness, Section 3 will shortly discuss to 
what extent the existence of free ISPs may be part of the strategic behaviour of 
telecommunications operators and fee-charging ISPs. 
 
3.1 Advertising 
3.1.1 ‘Success’ stories from the UK, the USA and Australia 
During the second half of the 90s, the United Kingdom appeared to be a successful 
pioneer in the field of free Internet access. According to a UK Internet source: “These 
totally free ISPs have several different methods they use to earn revenue. Some earn 
revenue from advertising and e-ecommerce sales. Many of them are actually phone 
companies who offer totally free Internet service as an enticement to get you to use their 
phone service for your regular phone calls as well”27. Internet site Australia.Internet.com 
similarly argues the success of free ISPs in the UK is due to the fact that “[…] calls are 
timed and the ISPs have revenue share agreements with the major Telcos”. Around the 
same time, free ISPs started to appear in the United States as well. This business model 
was mainly based on advertising and commerce revenues, however, and seemed quite 
                                                          
27 DailyeDeals (2002). 
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successful at first sight: revenues of giant NetZero (founded in 1997) had increased from 
US$122 at the end of 1998 to US$12,242 at the end of 1999! Specifically, some say 
NetZero could use the demographic information it obtained from its subscribers to charge 
US$10 more per demographic category (i.e, age, location, etc.) over their base rate of 
US$20 CPM28, going as high as US$65 CPM29. However, because operating expenses 
had increased substantially as well, Netzero ended up with a net loss of US$24,576 that 
year and eventually merged with its largest competitor, Juno (founded in 1995)30 halfway 
through 2001.  
 
Nevertheless, optimism was the rule at the time and most ISPs were convinced online 
advertising and e-commerce were little goldmines waiting to be exploited. In 1999, one 
of the leading research institutes expected Internet advertising expenditures to rise to 
US$22 billion by 200431. New Zealand’s neighbour Australia also got caught up in the 
hype and followed the example set by the Brittish and the Americans. Although 
Free.net.au had to cease its business only months after it was founded, rival FreeOnline 
appeared to be quite successful, claiming it had over 500,000 subscribers halfway 
through 2000. The experiences abroad and the global optimism and belief in rapidly 
expanding online commerce may have had some influence on the emergence of free ISPs 
in New Zealand in the beginning of 2000.   
 
3.1.2 ISPs in New Zealand financed by advertising revenues 
In February 2000, Compass Communications Ltd launched Freenet, an ISP that offered 
10 hours of free Internet access. It sought to finance the free service mainly through 
commissions from online sales rather than through advertising. Rival i4free was launched 
two months later. Although its main driver was the interconnection payments, it also 
considered alternative revenue streams. In addition to advertising and sales commissions, 
alternative revenue sources considered included charged technical support services, 
                                                          
28 CPM: cost per thousand units of advertisement; common measure in online advertising price 
calculations. 
29 Zigmont, J. (1999). 
30 At the time, Juno had approximately 10 million subscribers. Since their merger in June 2001 they are 
both part of United Online. 
31 Forrester Research at Iconocast.com (1999). 
 22
content filters, opt in email, and anti-virus software. All in all, these alternative revenue 
sources (that mainly consisted of advertising and sales commissions as most of the others 
were never implemented) accounted for approximately NZ$40,000 per month or 7.5% of 
i4free’s total revenue. Despite the seeming ‘success’ stories abroad, advertising and e-
commerce revenues have never become really significant to ISPs in New Zealand. ISP 
Xtra confirms that advertising revenues were almost fictional and mostly a matter of 
public relations – nowadays they still account for only 3 to 5% of total revenue. 
According to a number of (both free and charging) ISPs, advertising and e-commerce 
were relatively insignificant even to the free ISPs as they got the bulk of their revenues 
from interconnection payments.    
 
3.1.3 Flaws of the advertising and e-commerce business model 
Although it seemed a success formula in the beginning, after a while advertising revenues 
started to decrease dramatically, resulting in many free ISPs closing their business or 
charging their customers for their services. Reasons for this decline were twofold. The 
first is the global recession that followed the collapse of the NASDAQ stock exchange, 
representing and resulting in decreasing business and consumer confidence. Strengthened 
by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and a number of corporate scandals in the 
United States, this recession caused advertising spending to drop substantially32. Even 
though online advertisement is not included in the data published by the Communications 
Agencies Association of New Zealand (CAANZ)33, it is a fact that growth in total 
advertising in New Zealand decreased substantially during the global recession (see 
Appendix E). A second reason for decreasing advertising expenditure and the associated 
decline in free ISPs is inherent to the business model and has been put by the Economist 
(2002) as: “The reason for the bloodbath is simple: advertisers are not willing to pay 
enough for web ads to support the cost of displaying them”. As intermediate advertising 
                                                          
32 At the end of March 2001, NetZero and Juno – by then United Online – started billing certain services. 
At that time, their advertising and commerce revenues still amounted to US$10,992 and billable services 
revenues only contributed US$1,778, but the main revenue sources changed: in June 2002, their billable 
services accounted for US$47,888 whereas advertising and commerce revenues were US$6,561. United 
Online financial results. 
33 According to the CAANZ: “Online and direct marketing are not included in these figures, because 
expenditure is not measured officially”. However, a new online measurement system has recently started, 
called RedSherrif Internet Ratings, which is to overcome this problem.  
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networks and of course the ISPs take part of the revenue, the resulting revenue for the 
advertising company is not worth investing in an on line campaign in the first place. The 
results of a recent survey of 3,000 Web surfers34 confirm this.  
 
3.2 Revenue from terminating calls 
The second explanation for the existence of free ISPs appears to be the main reason for 
the development of free ISPs in New Zealand. The analysis is based on interconnection 
agreements between networks and associated revenue streams between networks and 
carriers and/or ISPs. As much contemporary literature modelling interconnection issues 
between networks is built on Laffont, Rey and Tirole ((LRT) 1998a), their basic model 
will be used to explain fundamental relations between actors in the telecommunication 
industry and their effects on performance. In addition, we will heavily draw upon Wright 
(2001) to translate the general results from Laffont et al (1998a) to the ISP market.  
 
3.2.1 The LRT model 
For the purpose of analysis, the basic model as described in Laffont et al (1998a) is 
subject to a number of assumptions. In their framework, networks are horizontally 
differentiated according to the Hotelling model of network competition35. Two other key 
assumptions are balanced calling patterns (i.e., for equal marginal prices, flows in and out 
of a network are balanced – even if market shares are not) and reciprocal access pricing 
(i.e., a network pays as much for termination of a call on the rival network (an “off-net 
call” as it receives for completing a call originated on the rival network). In addition, the 
basic model assumes total coverage (all consumers are connected to either one of the 
networks), constant elasticity of demand and no price discrimination36. A summarised 
mathematical overview of the model is given in Appendix F. 
 
                                                          
34 Burst! Media, in: CyberAtlas.internet.com (2002) 
35 According to the Hotelling model, in the simple case of uniform pricing, all consumers are distributed 
uniformly along a straight line and two networks are located at each end of the line. In this model, it is 
assumed that customers have no preference for either seller except on the ground of price plus the cost of 
transporting the goods from the network’s location to their own location. Hotelling (1929). 
36 See Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998b) for a version of the model that does allow for price discrimination. 
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When analysing reciprocal access pricing, a denotes the unit access charge to be paid for 
interconnection by a network to its competitor and σ is an index of substitutability 
between the two networks. One of the main conclusions of Laffont et al (1998a) is that 
when σ > 0 and all parameters are fixed except for the access charge a, a unique 
symmetric equilibrium exists for a close to marginal cost c, in which p1 = p2 = p*(a). 
However, that equilibrium fails to exist when the access charges are high and/or the 
degree of substitution between the networks is very low or high. A large access charge 
inflates the final price in any shared market equilibrium or – in case of sufficient 
substitutability – leads to an unstable situation in which each network could obtain 
positive profit by raising its price and generating access revenue. If substitutability is very 
low, each network may behave monopolistically, resulting in inefficiencies (and high 
access charges!) because of the double marginalisation problem37. If substitutability is 
high, each network has an incentive to undercut its rival’s prices in order to increase 
market share and avoid paying access charges.  
 
Not surprisingly, a related conclusion from the above model is that the two main 
determinants of competitiveness are access charge a and measure of substitutability 
between the two networks σ. The access charge may act as an instrument of tacit 
collusion in case it is agreed upon between two network operators, since retail price p* 
increases with a. Firms may keep retail prices artificially high by setting a high access 
charge. However, p* decreases with σ and it converges to the Ramsey price as σ gets very 
large38. The Ramsey benchmarks are obtained by maximizing consumer welfare subject 
to the industry breaking even. The resulting pR and aR are therefore considered socially 
optimal in the absence of industry subsidies or taxes39.  One of the main results from 
Laffont et al (1998a) is that the socially optimal access charge lies below the marginal 
cost of access, whereas the monopoly access charge lies above the Ramsey benchmark.  
 
                                                          
37 This problem arises when one monopoly’s mark-up is placed on top of another. 
38 To compare: for σ = 0, p* is equal to the monopoly price for marginal cost c + (a – c)/2  (which involves 
a double marginalisation problem if there is a markup on access).  
39 For a detailed derivation of Ramsey prices in one-way and two-way interconnection, see Jeon (2002). 
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Nonlinear price competition, i.e. two-part tariffs, yields pricing at marginal cost. 
However, for firms, these are not the industry marginal cost but rather the perceived 
marginal cost (including the effect of access charges). Compared to uniform pricing, two-
part tariffs leads to analogous results. The key difference, however, is the fact that the 
intensity of competition does not vary with access charge a. For instance, if access charge 
a is raised, each network’s marginal cost increases, and so do usage fees. To keep net 
surplus and market share constant, a network must reduce its fixed fee, which lowers the 
gain from attracting a new customer. But on the other hand, the increase in a provides an 
additional incentive to attract a customer, as this saves an extra amount in access charges. 
According to Laffont et al (1998a), the two effects cancel, which is why the intensity of 
competition does not vary with the access charge.   
 
3.2.2 Consequences for the ISP market 
The basic termination model shown in Figure 2.2 indicates the relations and revenue 
streams between the various actors in the telecommunications industry: the originating 
operator has to pay for interconnection links with the terminating operator, who in turn is 
likely to have an agreement with an ISP40. The principle of reciprocity broadly says that 
the access charges between two carriers must be the same for both carriers regardless of 
the direction of the traffic41. However, not only are there no return calls in the case of 
dial-in traffic bound for ISPs, the cost of terminating ISP-bound calls is far below the cost 
of terminating regular calls. According to Wright (2001): “The termination of ISP-bound 
traffic typically requires less equipment for call routing than voice calls since calls to 
ISPs can be broken out from the gateway switch and carried to the ISP’s modem bank. 
The routing of voice calls requires substantially more switching and transmission 
costs”42. In addition, calls to ISPs usually take much longer than regular calls. It appears 
that an important reason for the existence of free ISPs in general and the ones that existed 
in New Zealand in particular is the generation of lucrative termination revenue on ISP-
                                                          
40 According to OFTEL (2000), the termination operator will often act as a ‘backbone’ or ‘carrier ISP’ 
processing the traffic and providing connectivity to the Internet at large, while the ‘consumer ISP’ resells 
the Internet access provided by the carrier and packages it with its own content or portal site. 
41 Wright (2001). 
42 Moreover, ISP modem banks are far more geographically concentrated than a typical residential or 
business customer base. Wright (2001). 
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bound traffic. According to Wright (2001), the efficient termination charge for ISP-bound 
calls equals the network operator’s retail price for a local call, less the cost it incurs in 
originating the call. Assume rival networks set an access charge of  
 
     a  =  P  -  co 
 
per minute for termination, in which P reflects a regulated charge per minute for each 
call43 and co is the per-minute cost for originating or terminating a typical local call. 
Letting p denote a per-minute retail price for Internet usage and (cT  +  cI) the per–minute 
cost of providing the service, consumers of ISP dial-in then face usage prices of  
 
    p  +  P  =  cT  +  cI  -  P  +  co  +  P  
     =  cT  +  cI  +  co , 
 
which in fact reflect the true costs of ISP dial-in. However, in jurisdictions with binding 
regulation on the price of outgoing local calls, in particular free local calling44 and 
reciprocity for local call termination (as agreed upon by telecommunications operators in 
interconnection agreements) like New Zealand, efficient termination charging requires 
the cost price of local calls to be incurred by the (regulated) network operator (and passed 
on to consumers), instead of the lower usage price that is often used in practice. ISPs 
encourage greater Internet usage by lowering their usage prices, so that they can increase 
their termination revenues. As a result, Internet access will have a per-minute price below 
cost. Moreover, reciprocity implies that the per-minute component of any termination 
charge will be set above the efficient level. As a result of termination charges being set 
above the cost of terminating calls, money is transferred from the main network operator 
to the consumers and rival carriers, as arbitrage possibilities lead to increased Internet 
usage, the tendency for operators to set access prices even higher and Internet prices even 
lower, in turn attracting more users, etc.  Wright (2001) argues that for sufficiently high 
termination charges, ISPs will offer no per-minute charge (that is, flat rate Internet 
                                                          
43 P is considered optimal for local voice calls but not necessarily for ISP dial-in calls. See Wright (2001). 
44 As determined in the Kiwi Share Obligations. 
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access). Chambouleyron (2002) goes one step further by reasoning these termination 
revenues could possibly cover all costs the ISP has to incur and may therefore actually 
lead to free Internet access.  
 
3.3 Strategic behaviour of operators and fee-charging ISPs  
Arbitrage benefits from interconnection agreements and advertising revenues seem to be 
the main reasons for the development of most free ISPs. For the purpose of completeness, 
however, we should also look at other explanations that have been opted. These imply 
that offering free Internet access is part of the strategic behaviour of operators that have 
market power and / or fee-charging ISPs. Drawing upon Haan (2001), it can for example 
be shown that under certain conditions it is profitable for a monopolistic telephone 
operator to offer ISPs a lump-sum contract that induces them to offer free Internet access. 
Another explanation is that offering free Internet access may be part of a quality 
discrimination scheme of fee-charging ISPs in order to capture consumer surplus and 
maximize profits. 
 
3.3.1 Telephony operator offers contract to induce free Internet access 
The basic model assumes two firms, one providing regular telephony, the other providing 
Internet access. Haan (2001) assumes that each firm is a monopolist in its market. Joint 
profits are not maximized because of the double marginalisation problem. According to 
Carlton and Perloff (1994): “If the manufacturer and the distributor are both monopolies, 
each adds a monopoly mark-up (the difference between its price and its marginal cost is 
positive), so consumers face two mark-ups instead of one. This double mark-up provides 
an incentive for firms to either vertically integrate or use vertical restrictions to promote 
efficiency and thereby increase joint profits”. Haan (2001) bases its analysis mainly on 
this phenomenon and suggests that there is scope for side payments between the 
telecommunications operator and the ISP. According to Haan (2001), the optimal solution 
for firm T is to offer a lump sum L to firm A conditional on A setting pA = 0.  
 
Haan (2001) shows that when some of the stringent assumptions of the model are relaxed 
or additional assumptions are made, the basic result may still hold. For one, when 
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assuming the presence of transaction costs involved in setting up, formulating, and 
policing a contract, firm T will still find it profitable to offer a contract that induces free 
Internet access if a critical size of the market is reached. Secondly, when assuming a non-
cooperative oligopolistic rather than a monopolistic Internet market, it can still be 
profitable to offer a contract to an ISP that implies free Internet access. However, again a 
critical market size needs to be reached, which increases with N, the number of ISPs 
active. Another extension to the basic model shows the relationship between market size 
and the presence / absence of free Internet access when the dial-up Internet access market 
is included in the analysis (see Appendix G).  
 
A crucial argument against the practical relevance of Haan’s model, however, is the fact 
that the ISP market is in fact a rather contestable market – as we have seen in Section 2.2 
– instead of the monopoly assumed by Haan (2001).  Indeed, as indicated above, Haan 
recognises that as the number of firms N increases, it becomes increasingly less profitable 
to offer the ISPs a contract to induce free Internet access. Hence, in a competitive ISP 
market, we would not expect telecommunications operators to offer ISPs such contracts 
as there is no double mark-up problem to be solved, i.e., no joint profits to maximise.  
 
3.3.2 Quality discrimination 
Versioning is the practice of offering a product in different versions for different market 
segments. As versioning induces a process of self-selection, i.e., consumers reveal their 
price-sensitivity (or any other underlying characteristic) by choosing a particular version, 
producers may engage in non-uniform pricing in order to capture (part of) the consumer 
surplus and hence, maximize profits. Carlton and Perloff (1994) define non-uniform 
pricing as: “[…] charging customers different prices for the same product […]”. 
Specifically, quality discrimination is a method of non-uniform pricing in which a firm 
offers consumers different versions of its product for which price increases with quality.  
Quality discrimination allows producers to capture more consumer surplus than under a 
uniform pricing schedule. Free Internet access may be considered a free version of the 
product/service ‘Internet access’ in a quality discrimination scheme designed to maximise 
profits. 
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Shapiro and Varian (1999) argue that information goods are especially suited for 
versioning, as firms can easily and cheaply change certain product features as the costs of 
creating different versions of those products are usually marginal. The authors advise 
producers to identify the key dimensions of their product that are valued differently by 
various consumer segments, to induce a process of self-selection (see Figure 3.1).  
 
FIGURE 3.1 PRODUCT DIMENSIONS SUSCEPTIBLE TO VERSIONING  
                  Product Dimension      Likely Use(r)s 
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Similarly, different consumer segments place different values on the quality dimension 
‘technical support’, allowing ISPs to offer different support packages for different prices 
and let consumers show their price-sensitivity by selecting the amount of technical 
support of their preference. ISPs that charge for their Internet services usually offer 
technical support ‘for free’, whereas the users of i4free for example, had to pay NZ$2 per 
minute if they dialled the 0900 helpline. By similar reasoning, one can also see how the 
offering of different quality features such as email, web space, and (un)limited use may 
separate different market segments. In conclusion, by considering free Internet access as 
but one version of the service ‘Internet access’, firms may attract new customers and 
eventually induce them to pay a positive price for a higher quality version of Internet 
access. At the same time, to reduce profitable access by consumers, they offer consumers 
a wider variety of services and different prices. 
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4 Strategic and environmental causes of the emergence of free ISPs  
 
In addition to theoretical explanations of the development of free ISPs, it is very useful to 
analyse the forces that stimulated the development of free ISPs in New Zealand, as it was 
the first OECD country to introduce full competition in telecommunications. Having a 
closer look at specific competition and environment-related economic and strategic 
causes that may have stimulated that development will provide us with great insights in 
this business model and its implications for the telecommunications industry in general, 
and the ISP market in particular. Following the strategic timeline sketched in Figure 4.1, 
Sections 4.1 to 4.4 will analyse the main events in the recent history of the New Zealand 
telecommunications industry from a strategic perspective. Section 4.1 will analyse the 
strategies of both Telecom and Clear at the time of signing their interconnection 
agreement of 1996. Section 4.2 will then take a closer look at their strategies after the 
contract was signed, and what caused Clear to withhold payments to Telecom in 1997. 
Telecom’s response to the emergence of (free) ISPs on Clear’s network and heavy 
Internet growth was its 0867 access package, which is discussed in Section 4.3. Finally, 
Section 4.4 will analyse the 2000 interconnection agreements to indicate the main reasons 
for the death of the free ISPs.  
 
FIGURE  4.1 MAIN STRATEGIC EVENTS IN NEW ZEALAND’S TELECOMMUNICATIONS  
                        INDUSTRY SINCE 1995 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1996:  Telecom / Clear dispute and interconnection agreement 
1997:  Clear withholds payments to Telecom because of discounting competition 
1999:  Telecom starts trying to capture all data traffic within its 0867 number range 
2000:  Free ISPs emerge 
April: entry blocking 
May: 0867 agreement between Clear and Telecom 
Oct.: new ICAs signed;  bill-and-keep and callsink provisions 
1998:  The interconnection dispute continues… 
2001:  Free ISPs cease their business 
  Introduction of access regulation 
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4.1 The Telecom / Clear interconnection agreement 
4.1.1 (Lack of) Information  
At the time the interconnection agreement was negotiated there was information 
asymmetries and an uncertain future (see Figure 4.2). First of all, Telecom had been the 
sole telecommunications operator since 1987 and could therefore be expected to know 
the local call market in detail with respect to demand, technology, and regulation. In 
addition, it must have had more financial data concerning cost and revenue functions. 
Clear45, being the new entrant in the market, did not possess such data46. However, being 
a subsidiary of British Telecommunications, it could benefit from the latter’s experience 
in a regulated competitive environment – experience that Telecom lacked as it had been 
the incumbent monopolist until deregulation. 
 
FIGURE 4.2 INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES AND INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 
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There was incomplete information in the overall market in the sense that both players did 
neither know their (future) rival’s strategy, nor any future technological changes. The 
latter appeared to be crucial, as the surge in Internet growth and the associated demand 
for Internet services led to the emergence of (free) ISPs and consequentially, to a high 
volume of one-way traffic from Telecom’s network to Clear’s network (in turn leading to 
a high amount of one-way interconnection payments from Telecom to Clear). Lack of 
information about the future implies that economic actors act on the basis of their 
expectations in a world of uncertainty47.  
 
 
FIGURE 4.3 TO ENTER OR NOT TO ENTER 
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(πexp(HE) < π  , πexp(HE) < 0) 
 
 
 
(πexp(HN) < π  ,  0) 
 
 
 
 
(πexp(LE) >  πexp(HN)  , 
πexp(LE) > 0) 
 
 
 
 
(πexp(LN) = π  ,  0) Possible strategies Telecom: set a high or a low interconnection price. 
Possible strategies Clear: enter or not enter. 
 
π : current profit πexp : expected profit 
H: high (interconnection price)  L:  low  (interconnection price)  E: entry    N: no entry
Using Figure 4.3, we can reason backwards to get an understanding of the two telcos’ 
expectations at the time they signed their interconnection agreement. In a somewhat 
simplified version of the final negotiations between both parties, we can say that initially, 
Telecom had the choice of offering “high” (for example 5 ct/min) or “low” (i.e. 2 ct/min) 
interconnection prices. However, the idea behind the deregulation was to stimulate 
competition and offering a high interconnection price would most likely have been 
considered use of dominance as set out in S.36 of the 1986 Commerce Act. Given this 
reasoning, Telecom was more or less forced to offer relatively lower interconnection 
prices because the legal costs of breaching the Commerce Act would leave it worse off 
otherwise. In addition, the threat of bypass (i.e., other firms establishing and offering 
similar network services) would have put some pressure on Telecom’s pricing strategy. 
The above implied that Clear could make the main decision in this game: to enter or not 
to enter. We can reasonably assume that Telecom had some knowledge about Clear’s 
preferences as it could foresee that its rival was likely not to enter if it faced high 
interconnection prices (costs), but would enter if it faced low costs48. Knowing Clear’s 
preferences, Telecom had to compare its expected profits πexp in the possible outcomes 
“high – no entry” (HN) and “low – entry” (LE). Because we know the final outcome of 
the game (LE), we can reason that at the time of the interconnection agreement, Telecom 
must have expected the low pricing strategy to cause its future profits to be larger than 
they would be under a high pricing strategy (incorporating the effect of the legal costs of 
breaching the Commerce Act and the threat of bypass), given the fact that Clear would 
enter. Clear, however, expected positive profits as well. With the above expectations 
about their future profits, both parties signed the interconnection agreement in 1996.  
 
4.1.2 Risk bearing 
Arrow (1974) recognises that if markets for future goods (i.e. Internet services) are 
nonexistent, there will be uncertainties about the other markets (i.e. local call market). 
When there is uncertainty, risk aversion implies that steps will be taken to reduce risks. 
By signing the interconnection agreement with Telecom, Clear faced the risk that the spot 
                                                          
48 It is reasonable to assume Telecom had a fair idea about Clear’s preferences as Clear had already 
indicated these during earlier attempts to negotiate an interconnection agreement with Telecom. 
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market price of interconnection access might fall more quickly than expected, and also 
the risk that new pricing regimes that would be disadvantageous to Clear might become 
important in the market. Evans and Quiqley (2000) suggest that one way in which Clear 
was able to reduce this risk was to credibly use a claimed violation of the Commerce Act 
as a means of breaching a contract provision whose ex post realisation was 
disadvantageous for it (which is exactly what it did, see Section 4.2). It would choose to 
do so if  
 
E.LegalC < pr.(E.Compensation + E. LegalB + E.Award), 
 
i.e., if its expected (E) legal costs were smaller than the expected compensation, the legal 
costs of a unilateral breach (LegalB), and an anticipated award (adjusted for the 
probability of winning pr).  
 
Given the fact that Telecom knew Clear could reduce its risk this way, we would expect it 
to react in several ways49. First of all, it is likely that Telecom would make a larger 
specific investment in information relating to the range and probability associated with 
outcomes of the contract. Second, we would expect Telecom to shorten the length of the 
contract to restrict the period over which there would be uncertainty about the realisation 
of contingent events. Third, Telecom’s own lack of an option to breach a contract 
provision50 in combination with its investment in information and its preference for a 
short-term contract suggests that Telecom would require a higher expected return to sign 
the interconnection agreement.  Although we cannot comment on the investments 
Telecom has made in information associated with different outcomes, it did – counter-
intuitively - sign a contract for a five-year period, which, as Evans and Quigley (2000) 
justifiably note, is a long term given the rate and uncertainty of technological change and 
new entry to the modern telecommunications market. Apparently, the expected rate of 
return was sufficient for Telecom to outweigh the risk of Clear breaching the contract and 
claiming violations of the Commerce Act, and to sign the interconnection agreement.   
                                                          
49 Evans and Quiqley (2000). 
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4.1.3 Role of regulation 
Although any potential for bypass, and competition enforced by the Commerce Act more 
or less forced Telecom to offer relatively low access charges in its negotiations with 
Clear, there was great legal uncertainty concerning S.27 and S.36 of the 1986 Commerce 
Act. According to Evans and Quigley (2000), there is no unambiguous definition of 
contractual provisions that are in breach of the Commerce Act and it is in most cases a 
time consuming and expensive process to ascertain whether the Commerce Act has in 
fact been violated. They reasoned this is partly due to the wording of Section 27 of the 
Commerce Act51. Uncertainty concerning possible future events that may cause a contract 
to breach S.27 of the Commerce Act created legal uncertainty in designing the 1996 
interconnection agreement. In addition, when Telecom and Clear commenced 
negotiations, the application of S.36 of the Commerce Act to the problem of ensuring 
access to the facilities of an integrated monopolist was largely untested. In the light-
handed regime, application of the Commerce Act and Court processes were considered 
last-resort methods to solve interconnection negotiation difficulties. As a consequence, 
there was a high degree of uncertainty surrounding what behaviour the Courts would hold 
to be anticompetitive, and, in particular, the legal limits on the terms and conditions that 
Telecom could legally offer52. This uncertainty has delayed access agreement and is one 
of the reasons why negotiations between both parties took five years. However, contrary 
to what one would expect (short-term contracts because of the high costs of signing long-
term contracts due to uncertainty), Telecom and Clear signed a five-year interconnection 
agreement.   
 
4.2 The dispute continues… 
4.2.1 Action and reaction 
Only five months after signing the agreement, Clear attempted to renegotiate its terms. In 
February 1997, it began withholding ten percent of the amount due to Telecom in terms 
                                                                                                                                                                             
50 A dominant firm would be less likely to be able to appeal to the Commerce Act for a justification of 
breach.  
51 See Appendix B. 
52 Ministry of Commerce (1995) 
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of the agreement53. In April that year, Telecom sought High Court orders to confirm 
Clear’s ability to pay the disputed charges, that by then allegedly exceeded NZ$20 
million54. According to the Ministry of Economic Development, Clear filed a defence to 
Telecom’s claim on 5 May 1997, counter-claiming alleged breaches by Telecom of the 
Commerce and Fair Trading Acts. Specifically, Clear alleged that Telecom had 
deliberately changed Clear customers who pre-selected Clear as their long distance calls 
provider, back to Telecom, and that Telecom’s practice of selling services at a discount 
where the amount of discount significantly depended on the composition and value of the 
bundle, was anticompetitive and contravened the Commerce Act. In 1998, the Court of 
Appeal reaffirmed that Clear could withhold payments until a final judgment was 
delivered55. The two-part interconnection agreement between Telecom and Clear 
consisted of a volume usage charge with the fixed connection fee set at zero. Hence, 
whatever the scale of Clear’s business, it would pay a flat per minute usage charge, which 
implied that Clear had no access to any volume discounting that other forms of two-part 
tariffs could have provided and that would have allowed it to match Telecom’s prices56.   
 
4.2.2 Analysis of the parties’ expectations and strategies 
Telecom had used its discount strategy on a trial basis in the period before the contract 
with Clear was signed, and this was public knowledge at the time the contract was 
actually signed. This implies that Clear might have foreseen that Telecom would apply 
similar strategies in the future (“discount”), to depart from the equilibrium created by the 
interconnection agreement attempting to increase profits. If we further assume that 
Telecom could in turn foresee the likely option of Clear breaching the contract and 
claiming a violation of competition law as a response strategy (“breach”), we can set up a 
similar sequential game to the one in Figure 4.3 to analyse both parties’ expectations 
after the interconnection agreement was signed57. Knowing that Clear would probably 
                                                          
53 Carter and Wright (1997). 
54 The New Zealand Herald (1999a). 
55 Ibid. 
56 Evans and Quiqley (2000). 
57 Note that is it implicitly assumed that Clear would only breach the contract as a response to Telecom’s 
alleged anticompetitive pricing schedule, and would not do so if Telecom would not engage in that strategy 
because Clear would probably not have a strong case in court and legal costs would decrease its profits. 
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only breach the contract if Telecom applied its discount pricing strategy58, the latter was 
faced with the choice between “discount – breach” (DB) and “not discount – not breach” 
(NN). As its expected profits were apparently higher in the first option, the new 
equilibrium outcome was the one in which Telecom applied its toll discounts and Clear 
breached the contract and turned to the judicial system claiming a violation of the 
Commerce Act, reasoning the discount scheme set aside the interconnection contract, or 
parts of it.  
 
 
FIGURE 4.4 TO DISCOUNT OR NOT TO DISCOUNT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Possible strategies Telecom: to discount or not to discount. 
Possible strategies Clear: to breach or not to breach. 
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D: discount  N: not discount     B: breach
Telecom 
 
  Discount    
 
 
 
 
 
  
  Not  
  discount 
 
 
Breach 
 
 
 
Not breach 
 
 
 
 
Breach 
 
 
 
 
Not breach 
 
Clear 
 
 
                                                          
58 It would financially not make sense for Clear to breach the contra
absence of Telecom’s discount strategy, because it would most prob
Telecom and consequently, high legal costs and low expected payoffs. 
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4.2.3 Exogenous technological change 
During the ongoing struggles between the telco’s, an exogenous change in technology 
that was not incorporated in the parties’ expectations (see Figure 4.2) occurred. Internet 
growth had surged and consequently, the demand for Internet services had risen 
substantially. Clear soon realised that this demand would cause a high amount of one-
way traffic to ISPs and hence, that terminating those calls – if originated on the Telecom 
network - would enable it to generate large amounts of interconnection revenues. Due to 
the Kiwi Share Obligations’ free local call requirement and th4e fact that Telecom 
supplied almost all household access, most calls to ISPs did originate on the Telecom 
network (at zero price), allowing Clear to benefit of all one-way traffic to ISPs on its 
network59. As we would expect, Clear signed interconnection contracts with many ISPs 
in which it agreed to give them a certain percentage of the extra revenue it got for every 
minute of ISP-generated traffic. These offers were a strong incentive for most ISPs to 
agree to operate on Clear’s network, as before that time, they actually had to purchase 
business lines from either network in order to be able to offer their services. In fact, 
interconnection revenues turned out to be more than sufficient for some to offer free 
Internet access. As Clear acted as the first-mover in the new equilibrium that was now 
characterised by the exogenous technological change that was called ‘Internet growth’, 
all Telecom could do was to cover this action to protect as much of its market share as 
possible. Free ISPs were an arbitrage response to the existing interconnection agreement 
that offered these opportunities because of exogeneous technological changes.  
 
4.3 Telecom’s response to (free) ISPs: the 0867 access package 
4.3.1 The problems faced by Telecom 
According to the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research (Febr. 2000), the fact that 
the physical structure and workings of the network and the financial arrangements that 
surround it, were out of kilter with the way it was being used, created two problems: 
• a possible series of physical risks to the smooth operation of the network; 
                                                          
59 This is the main reason why operation of free ISP Surf4nix was not viable: as it operated solely on 
Telecom’s network, it could not benefit from interconnection payments from Telecom to Clear. 
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• a genuine resource cost problem relating to a growing mismatch between the 
charging regime and the incentives to users. 
The first problem appeared much less severe to Telecom than the second, as counter 
arguments claimed Telecom had an intelligent network superimposed on the basic 
network and calls beginning with 08 and 09 were automatically routed on to the 
intelligent network, giving Telecom more traffic control60. In addition, Telecom’s own 
ISP Xtra was one of the major growth drivers, implying that Telecom would know about 
the growth in traffic. Telecom did have reason to worry about the second issue. 
According to The New Zealand Herald (2000d): “[…] if a customer was permanently 
online, he or she would rack up more than 700 hours of use in a month, costing Telecom 
more than NZ$840 in interconnect charges per line”. The 0867 access package was to 
solve both these problems and, hence, to protect Telecom’s profitability.  
 
4.3.2 Telecom’s instruments to enforce 0867 numbers 
Telecom had a number of instruments with which it attempted to route all data traffic 
through its network. According to The New Zealand Herald (2000d): “To make the 
switch palatable, [Telecom] pledged to the Government that 0867 calls would remain free 
and that their quality would be as least as good as the old numbers”. In addition, Telecom 
charged its customers 2c/min after ten hours of free monthly access for standard local 
dial-ups. Unwilling to pay this rate, many customers became willing to dial a free 0867 
number to access their ISP, instead of the normal seven-digit number. This forced ISPs to 
sign a 0867 agreement with Telecom so that their customers would actually be able to 
access them through a particular 0867 number. Shortly before the 0867 prefix would 
come into effect at the beginning of November 1999, Telecom announced it would not 
deliver Internet traffic to or from other networks that had not signed. At that time, no 
other network had signed the ‘agreement’ presented by Telecom61.  An alternative 
approach to persuade ISPs to sign a 0867 agreement was to offer compensation deals. 
Notably, rumors circulated that Ihug had received a compensation payment to sign the 
agreement with Telecom62. About ten ISPs – including Ihug – had been granted 
                                                          
60 New Zealand Institute of Economic Research (2000). 
61 The New Zealand Herald (1999b) 
62 The Internet Society of New Zealand (2000). 
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extensions to complete the switch to the 0867 gateway (i.e., dial the old seven-digit 
number in case of connection problems) because Telecom had failed to provide the 
service by its own November 1 deadline.    
 
4.3.3 Number porting and entry blocking 
Free ISP i4free was to launch 3 April 2000 on Clear’s network, but its entry was 
effectively blocked by Telecom, as it cut off lines servicing the ISP and organisations 
believed to be associated with it. I4free was going to use number porting, i.e., diverting 
calls to its 0867 number to Clear’s network to still be able to terminate Internet calls on 
that network and receive interconnection payments from Telecom for it (see Figure 2.1 
and Section 2.2). Telecom argued that its actions were due to fears of exchange overload. 
Later that day, an interim injunction was granted barring Telecom from disconnecting 
i4free users. Justice Potter ruled that if overloading occurred, Telecom had to apply its 
restrictions proportionately on other 0867 Internet users as well – which it had not done 
(Freenet, for example said not to be affected by the overloading). In addition, the ruling 
commented that the growth in Internet calls had not been entirely unanticipated, as 
Telecom’s own ISP, Xtra, was the largest contributors to that growth63. However, four 
days later, the newspapers reported that Telecom was again restricting access to i4free, 
overriding the interim injunction64. Telecom argued it had to do so because it’s Airedale 
St exchange in central Auckland was experiencing severe overloading. Today, both i4free 
and the Commerce Commission are still involved in a Court battle against Telecom 
alleging the above behaviour and the introduction of the 0867 access package were anti-
competitive. Another example of entry blocking occurred in the same week, although that 
appeared to be merely ‘a public statement’65.  
                                                          
63 PECC (April 2000). 
64 Attrition (2000). 
65 According to The New Zealand Herald (2000c): “Ihug blocked the i4free and Freenet websites after 
learning that i4free had won a temporary injunction on Monday that prevented Telecom from disconnecting 
i4free’s 0867 access number”. The main reason for barring its 65,000 customers from accessing the two 
rival free web services was to protect its users from a market aberration. Ihug states the action was merely a 
public statement of its managing director at the time, Nick Wood, to show he did not believe the free 
Internet scenario was a viable one. Ihug admits that New Zealand’s light-handed regulation and weak 
enforcement mechanism did play a role in deciding to actually make the statement. Ihug reversed its 
restriction shortly after, following widespread complaints from users and condemnation from the Internet 
Society of New Zealand. 
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4.3.4 Clear and Telecom reach 0867 agreement 
In May 2000, Clear and Telecom finally reached a three-and-half-month agreement on 
the 0867 access package, which, according to both parties, provided a breathing space in 
which they could renegotiate their interconnection agreement, which was to expire at the 
end of 2000. The main result was that Internet users would no longer pay 2c/min for non-
0867 Internet calls. Other aspects of the agreement were: 
- Clear and Telecom would sign an agreement whereby Clear would provide 
Internet access services under an 0867 agreement; 
- Clear would withdraw its application for an interim injunction requiring Telecom 
to honour the terms of the number portability agreement between the two 
companies; 
- Telecom would not appeal against the interim injunction granted to 14free66. 
 
4.3.5 Role of competition law 
It is likely that the regulatory setting in the telecommunications industry in New Zealand, 
characterised by a high degree of uncertainty surrounding what behaviour the Courts 
would hold to be anticompetitive, influenced Telecom’s decision to introduce the 0867 
package in the first place. Carlton and Perloff (1994) state: “Large expected penalties 
reduce the expected value of forming a cartel […]”. The same reasoning applies to use of 
a dominant position under the Commerce Act. In other words, because Telecom expected 
there to be uncertainty about the legality of its actions and because it did not expect 
punishment, it probably introduced the 0867 package earlier than it would have done 
under stricter regulation. Indeed, the legality of the 0867 issue was the subject of 
disagreement. The New Zealand Institute for Economic Research (Febr. 2000) thought of 
the 0867 package as a “[…] solution that would have emerged in a competitive market 
and probably one approved by a ‘rational-regulator’ […]” and was of the opinion that the 
0867 ‘solution’ was efficient in the New Zealand setting. However, ISPs and Clear of 
course protested against the 0867 access, and in August 2000, the Commerce 
Commission commenced High Court action against Telecom, alleging that it contravened 
                                                          
66 Scoop Business (2000). 
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S.36 of the Commerce Act67 in introducing its 0867 package. As mentioned earlier, the 
case is still to be settled. 
 
4.4 The 2000 interconnection agreements 
The series of interconnection agreements that started approximately in 2000 is quite 
distinctive from the 1996 agreements. First, Telecom entered into limited “bill and keep” 
type agreements with its main competitors, which means that so long as the number of 
calls between each local network is roughly in balance neither party charges the other for 
taking or receiving calls68. In the interconnect agreement between Telecom and 
TelstraSaturn (July 2000), both parties agreed that “[…] the per-Call and per-minute 
charges each carrier must pay […] are nil for all Chargeable Intra-LICA (Local 
Interconnect Calling Area) Calls unless the Calls involve Excess Minutes”, where ‘excess 
minutes’ account for potential imbalances in taking / receiving calls. In the interconnect 
agreement between Telecom and Clear (Oct. 2000), the same charges were “[…] nil for 
all Chargeable Calls unless the Calls involve Uncapped Minutes”, where ‘uncapped 
minutes’ referred to minutes called in excess of specific quantity limits agreed upon by 
both parties69. 
 
Secondly, the 2000 interconnection agreements distinguished themselves from their 
predecessors in that they introduced the concept of “callsink calls”, which were intra-
LICA calls terminating at “[…] any Local Number or group of Local Numbers allocated 
to an Entity […] where  
(a) that Local Number, or each Local number within that group, receives during a 
month more than 10 times as many minutes of Chargeable Intra-LICA Calls than 
the minutes of Chargeable Intra-LICA Calls originating at such Local Numbers 
during that month (“the Asymmetrical Traffic Number or Numbers”); and  
                                                          
67 See Appendix B. 
68 Ministry of Economic Development (2001). 
69 For example, there is a cap of 1,142,500,000 minutes in aggregate in the case of a) standard calls and 
intra-LICA calls terminating in a primary major LICA in which the calls are handed over and (b) toll 
bypass calls and toll-free calls originating in a primary major LICA in which Clear has established a 
handover point. Telecom (2000b). 
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(b) the Asymmetrical Traffic Number or Numbers receive during a month more than 
the Threshold Percentage of the total minutes of Chargeable Intra-LICA Calls 
received during that month in that LICA by the carrier that is terminating Intra-
LICA Calls at the Asymmetrical Traffic Number of Numbers”70. 
In Section 4.1 of the Telecom-Clear interconnection agreement and in Section 5.1 of the 
Telecom-TelstraSaturn interconnection agreement, it was agreed that: “[…] the per-Call 
and per-minute charges […] are not payable for any Chargeable Intra-LICA Calls 
terminating at any Callsink”. The ‘clean slate’ deal between Clear and Telecom further 
included a settlement of all litigation between Clear and Telecom, including Commerce 
Act and 0867 proceedings, Clear getting wholesale access to Telecom’s fast Internet 
service Jetstream, and charges at an agreed rate for 1828 million minutes of toll calls and 
49 million minutes of mobile calls by Clear customers. 
 
The callsink clause implied that carriers would no longer charge their competitors / ICA 
partners for terminating calls on the dial-up numbers of (free) ISPs, which by definition 
generated much one-way traffic and could be characterized as “callsinks”. Herewith 
disappeared the main source of revenue for most free ISPs. The “bill and keep” clause 
only marginally contributed to this effect, however, as it required a ‘rough balance’ 
between the numbers of calls between the networks (and carriers could thus only 
marginally benefit from ‘rough imbalances’). Nevertheless, the 2000 interconnection 
agreements, and especially the “callsink” clauses, can justifiably be considered the main 
cause of the end of the free ISPs and return to charged Internet access. Mr. Karim 
Hussona, chief executive of Compass Communications (Freenet), stated literally: “In the 
past, when it was funded by interconnection, it was easy to make money out of it. Now 
the customers have to pay for it”71.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
70 Telecom (2000b). 
71 “It” being the provision of Internet access (red.). The New Zealand Herald (2001).  
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5 The implications of free Internet Service Providers in New Zealand 
 
The fact that free ISPs have emerged, operated, and then ceased business in New Zealand 
enables us to analyse the effects that free ISPs had on Internet access demand and supply, 
and to learn from the New Zealand experience to anticipate possible outcomes in other 
countries. To obtain a comprehensive understanding of the implications of free ISPs, we 
have to compare usage data before, during, and after the existence of free ISPs. The 
number of customers and the amount of Internet usage are our main instruments in 
conducting this analysis. In Section 5.1 we analyse the implications of the free ISP 
development on demand for Internet services in New Zealand, mainly utilising data from 
New Zealand’s largest ISP (Xtra – 50% market share72). Section 5.2 takes a closer look at 
the (potential) effects of free ISPs on economic efficiency, competition, and overall 
welfare. Finally, Section 5.3 discusses the key differences between the New Zealand case 
and the ISP developments in the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom, and 
the associated differences in performance.  
 
5.1 Implications of free ISPs on the demand for Internet services 
5.1.1 Free ISPs lead to increased market demand for Internet services 
We expect the emergence of free ISPs to cause an increase in the demand for Internet 
services, as (for normal goods) price declines increase demand. However, growth in 
telecommunication services occurred anyway due to exogeneous factors and network 
effects associated with adoption of the Internet73. These also account for increasing 
demand for Internet access and so the appropriate variable to examine for the effects of 
ISPs is the growth of demand for Internet access. Emergence of free Internet services on 
top of the continuous growth effects mentioned above would lead to the expectation of an 
increased growth in market demand and substitution away from pay ISPs with the 
introduction of free ISPs. These two effects are confirmed as we observe an increase in 
total Internet usage growth (see Figure 5.1)74 as well as a decrease in Xtra’s consumer 
                                                          
72 Xtra market share estimations (2002). 
73 Where the value of most network services tends to increase with the number of users. 
74 However, the evidence of Figure 5.1 is that the effect of free ISPs on overall growth is limited because 
there were other growth episodes inicated by the Nielsen (2002) statistical sample. Because it is a sample, 
some variation is to be expected.  
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market share in the period the free ISPs existed. Its business market share has remained 
relatively constant, however, implying that mainly residential consumers subscribed to 
the free ISPs (see Figure 5.2). This may be explained by businesses placing relatively 
more value on quality than price (and pay ISPs were associated with a higher quality than 
free ISPs). 
 
 
FIGURE 5.1 INTERNET USAGE LAST FOUR WEEKS 1998 – 2001 
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5.1.2 Increased growth in demand for pay ISP services after existence of free ISPs 
Even though Xtra’s market share decreased, the growth in its number of accounts has 
been fairly stable in the period before, during, and after the existence of free ISPs, 
roughly ranging between 1 and 4 % per month (see Figure 5.3). This implies that in 
absolute terms, Xtra growth was not affected by the emergence of the free ISPs75.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
75 The sudden drop in October 2001 can be explained by the fact that at that point in time, Xtra removed all 
its inactive accounts (accounts that had not been used for 12 months, most likely because they only served 
as an insurance against potentially failing free ISPs). Before that time, the minimum package offered by 
Xtra was NZ$2.50 per hour with no minimum charge. From October 2001, however, Xtra charged NZ$5 
for the minimum package and forced inactive users to leave. In other words, this peak was not caused by an 
exogenous event in the ISP market and is therefore not of great significance to our analysis. 
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FIGURE 5.3 XTRA’S DIAL-UP GROWTH JULY 1999 – JUNE 2002  
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In fact, if we analyse the total number of accounts, we see (ignoring the October 2001 
peak) an almost linear, unchanged growth of pay ISP accounts, as indicated in Figure 5.4. 
 
FIGURE 5.4 XTRA’S NUMBER OF DIAL-UP ACCOUNTS JULY 1999 – JUNE 2002 
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The periods before/during and after the existence of free ISPs roughly coincide with the 
periods before and after the October 2001 peak, which enables us to separately analyse 
the implications of free ISPs on growth in Internet services offered by pay ISPs. One 
would expect an increase in growth in the number of accounts of pay ISPs after most free 
ISPs ceased their business. Many people tried out the Internet through a free ISP because 
it did not cost anything but still allowed them to explore the “new” service that was 
becoming more and more common in society. These people often signed up with one of 
the pay ISPs after the free ISPs ended their operation because at that point they had 
become aware of the benefits and willing to pay for Internet access76. Another reason for 
the expectation of increased growth after the retirement of free ISPs is the expected 
substitution back to the pay ISPs from existing users who had switched to free ISPs while 
they existed. 
 
Linear regressions on the number of pay ISP accounts for the entire period (excl. Oct. 
2001) and the separate periods July 1999 – Sept. 2001 and Nov. 2001 – June 2002 
(thereby excluding Oct. 2001 and roughly distinguishing the period before and during, 
and the period after the existence of free ISPs) result in the outcomes shown in Figure 
5.5. Within these regressions, the dependent variable (y) is the number of dial-up 
accounts, whereas the independent variable (x) is time, measured in months. 
 
 
FIGURE 5.5 LINEAR REGRESSION ON XTRA’S NUMBER OF DIAL-UP ACCOUNTS    
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             Period         Trend line equation        R² 
 
 
July 1999 – June 2002 y = 5717.581x + 220401.01  R² = 0.904 
(excl. Oct. 2001) 
 
July 1999 – Sept. 2001 y = 7689.369x + 199580.39  R² = 0.992 
 
Nov. 2001 – June 2002 y = 9503.881x + 74448.869  R² = 0.989 
 
                                                       
 Xtra (Dec. 2002). 
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The fact that the trend lines for both separate periods each individually have a very high 
R² (the coefficient of determination that tells how well the sample regression line fits the 
data) which in both cases is higher than the R² of the regression covering the entire 
period, and the fact that the slopes of the trend lines in the separate periods differ to an 
extent that is significant, indicates that growth in Internet services differed in those two 
periods77.  
 
5.1.3 Dual usage 
Hence, the data suggest that growth in the number of accounts with pay ISPs did increase 
after the free ISPs ceased their business. However, this effect is possibly mainly due to 
the fact that the free ISPs had been able to enlarge the market. Many Internet users who 
were already ISP customers at the time the free ISPs emerged did, may not have 
substituted away from their pay ISP to free ISPs. Rather, they became so-called ‘dual 
users’, who maintained an account with a pay ISP while also signing up with a free ISP. 
The rationale behind this is twofold. When the first free ISP emerged (Freenet), it only 
offered a limited amount of free Internet access – existing users kept an account with the 
(pay) ISP that until then had provided them with Internet access outside these limited free 
hours. Second, existing users expected or experienced the quality offered by the free ISPs 
to be relatively low, in that congested lines would cause lower speed of operation and the 
need to reconnect more frequently. These users kept a minimum account with another 
free ISP or a pay ISP as an insurance which they could use in case of poor performance 
of their main ISP. The minimum package offered by Xtra at the time was NZ$2.50 per 
hour with no minimum charge. One indication of dual usage is that many people shifted 
to that package once the free ISPs emerged78. Another is the large number of inactive 
accounts with pay ISP Xtra, as many people did not actually use their pay account in 
practice as the limits on free Internet access expanded. However, we cannot simply 
                                                          
77 Running a right-tail t-test to test the statistical significance of this apparent difference confirms that we 
can reject the null-hypothesis that there is no difference at a 5% significance level (see Appendix I). It 
should be noted though, that the second period (Nov. 2001 – June 2002) only consists of 8 observations and 
that such a small sample size may influence the statistical significance of the difference between the both 
periods. When more data becomes available, we can run the same test again to establish whether the 
difference is actually statistically significant or whether the difference perhaps appears to represent natural 
variation in the data. 
78 Xtra (Dec. 2002). 
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conclude that all inactive users were by definition dual users, and should therefore be 
careful in drawing conclusions from Figure 5.6, where the amount of inactive users is an 
approximate indication of dual usage.    
 
 
FIGURE 5.6 XTRA’S TOTAL, ACTIVE, AND INACTIVE USERS 
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A better indication of the type of dual usage is given by the percentages of customers who 
had a particular combination of free and/or pay ISPs, as shown in Figure 5.7.  We see 
that the main form of dual usage appears to be a combination of a pay and a free ISP, 
which is analogous to the rationale explained above. Total dual usage decreased as the 
free ISPs retired and the relative quality of pay ISPs improved over time (which may also 
explain the decrease in dual usage between multiple pay ISPs). 
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FIGURE 5.7 DUAL USAGE 
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5.2 Implications of free ISPs on efficiency and competition 
5.2.1 Inefficieny in the ISP market 
Economic efficiency implies an allocation of resources within the e
time, such that  
(1) no other allocation would permit more of one good to be 
necessarily reducing the output of some other good (productive
(2) the goods and services produced are the ones most valu
(allocative efficiency); and  
(3) welfare of society is maximised over time (dynamic efficiency)
 
The question is whether the free ISP development has taken 
telecommunications industry closer to or further away from full eco
Allocative efficiency may have been inhibited. The fact that the free I
 53Multiple free  
Pay and free 
Multiple pay 3% 
% 
% r of survey respondents 
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     n =100               n = 770               n = 603                n = 540              n = 266  conomy and over 
produced without 
 efficiency); 
ed by consumers 
.  
the New Zealand 
nomic efficiency. 
SPs were basically 
financed by Telecom through interconnection payments to Clear implies that resources in 
the industry were allocated such that the productive efficiency principle was likely to be 
violated. First, the fact that a price of zero in the ISP market will be lower than marginal 
cost implies that there is excessive demand, in that willingness to pay for the extra 
demand is exceeded by its extra cost. Even where in these networks marginal cost for 
general usage is very low, congestion renders high peak marginal costs. In addition, there 
are the costs of actually providing the ISP services (i.e. labour etc.). If the consumers who 
cause these costs are not paying them, the inefficiency of excess demand can arise.  
 
Allocative efficiency would also be affected if Telecom’s pricing or the quality of the 
network was affected. If Telecom’s costs were entirely fixed, we would not expect to see 
a change in the telecommunications market. In this case the total net inefficiency would 
just be the one created in the ISP market.  However, if Telecom’s ‘subsidising’ of the free 
ISPs induced increased competition on other markets than the ISP market the effect of 
this competition would affect the efficiency of free ISPs.  
 
5.2.2 Effects on competition in the PSTN market 
The free ISP development is likely to have intensified competition in the 
telecommunications industry, eventually resulting in what appears to be accelerated 
consolidation. Presumably responding to the rising demand for Internet services and the 
increasingly obvious benefits of call termination and network effects, many 
telecommunications operators engaged in investments to expand their networks. In 
February 2000, around the same time that Freenet was launched, Saturn Communications 
and Telstra New Zealand formed a 50:50 joint venture, announcing to invest more than 
NZ$1 billion over five years to build a broadband network79. Two months later, the new 
company TelstraSaturn purchased ISP Paradise Net Ltd, which at the time had 33,000 
(mainly residential) subscribers throughout New Zealand. Also in April 2000, 
TelstraSaturn signed a contract with Ericsson Communications to install a new broadband 
submarine cable between Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch. One month later, 
Telecom announced NZ$38 million plans to establish a new submarine cable between 
                                                          
79 Ministry of Economic Development (2001). 
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North and South Island. Clear followed by announcing to spend NZ$14 million to 
upgrade its North Island network in August that year.  
 
After having separately invested millions of dollars to establish their own small network, 
Telstra purchased Clear in December 2001, aiming to strengthen its competitive position 
relative to Telecom’s. At the time, Clear owned New Zealand’s largest free ISP (Zfree) 
and the pay-service Clearnet, and had interconnection agreements with many (free) ISPs 
that operated on its network. Telecom’s ISP Xtra was the largest ISP (approximately 50% 
market share), while Ihug occupied a solid second place, traditionally being the first-
mover, technologically speaking. To obtain Ihug’s cooperation, or at least non-resistance, 
in the battle of the Telcos, and limiting other networks to terminate ISP calls may well 
explain the alleged compensation payment to Ihug (see Section 4.3.2). The extra 
profitability to Clear may have financed its ability to compete. In short, the increased 
demand for Internet services and the free ISP development based on interconnection 
charges appear to have intensified competition between telecommunication operators in 
New Zealand, resulting in a highly concentrated telecommunications industry compared 
to the (already quite concentrated) market before the mentioned developments.  
 
5.2.3 Effects on Telecom 
First, Telecom’s profits in the market for regular telephony services may have decreased 
because of increased costs due to increased demand for ISP services generating higher 
traffic flows, and increased competition. The Kiwi Share Obligations limited Telecom’s 
possibilities of raising residential access prices and no actual price increases have been 
observed. The counterfactual pricing strategy in the absence of free ISPs is not 
observable. There may have been some negative effect of the extra traffic on the quality 
of some of Telecom’s regular telephony services provided in the course of 2001 (see 
Appendix H) but it is well within variations experienced at other times.  
 
Second, Telecom’s profits may have decreased because the apparent profits to be made 
through interconnection charges intensified competition, resulting in a flatter, or more 
elastic, demand curve for Telecom’s services. Indeed, we did observe increasing 
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investments and consolidation among ISPs and telco’s (see Section 5.2.3). Transition to 
the 0867 number range implied ISP operation via Telecom’s Intelligent Network80, which 
allowed Telecom to have more traffic control. Any decreased congestion costs would 
have benefited consumers81.  
 
5.2.4 Effects on dynamic efficiency 
The fact that the free ISP development in New Zealand may not have been statically 
economically efficient does not imply it had no benefits. On the contrary, the potential 
dynamic gains in efficiency flowing from free Internet services may well outweigh the 
economic inefficiencies in the process of political decision-making with regard to 
telecommunications regulation. For one, Howell (2000) states that the free ISPs have 
appealed “[…] to use where either the usage and hence marginal benefit to the consumer 
of ISP services is low or for users where, while the benefit is significant, Internet 
connectivity is a lower priority than other household services”. Hence, providing price-
sensitive and/or low-income users free Internet services enabled learning and increased 
the market, which in turn increased the value of the Internet network as the value of a 
network increases with the number of users. At the same time, the free ISP development 
narrowed the so-called ‘digital divide’ (that indicates the different Internet access 
possibilities between low and high-income users), thereby creating a more equitable 
social redistribution. Together, these effects increased New Zealand’s Internet penetration 
rates in international comparisons, strengthening New Zealand’s position as one of the 
world leaders in the development and uptake of Internet82 (see Section 5.3).  
 
The free ISP episode may have affected dynamic efficiency in two opposite ways. On the 
one hand, firms in the telecommunications industry may not have the appropriate long-
term incentives to invest, innovate or improve the range and quality of services thereby 
increasing productivity and lowering costs through time. Consumers facing artificially 
                                                          
80 The Internet Society of New Zealand (2002). 
81 Incidentally, the ability to study voice and data traffic separately puts New Zealand in an almost unique 
position as most other countries cannot differentiate between voice and data traffic as all calls use the same 
telephone lines. The learning effects from the New Zealand experience may therefore be of wide interest 
and applicability.   
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low prices for dial-up Internet (caused by free local calling and free Internet access) may 
show unnaturally little demand for innovations such as high-speed Internet access, which 
may make it unprofitable for firms to invest in such services in the long run. On the other 
hand, more customers or usage may stimulate faster uptake of Internet services and 
therefore increase innovation. Although many telecommunications operators invested in 
high-speed Internet services during the free ISP development, expecting the increased 
demand for Internet services to spill over from dial-up access, we do observe that the 
uptake of broadband in New Zealand is relatively low within the OECD area. Figure 5.8 
displays the number of DSL, cable modem lines and other broadband per 100 inhabitants.  
 
FIGURE 5.8 BROADBAND PENETRATION RATES (JUNE 2001) 
 
Source: OECD (2001) 
 
 
It appears from total broadband usage data (see Figure 5.9), however, that uptake growth 
in New Zealand has been rather stable over time and, indeed, seems to have been 
positively influenced by the existence of free ISPs.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
82 Boles de Boer, Evans, and Howell (2000) and OECD (2002). 
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FIGURE 5.9 BROADBAND UPTAKE IN NEW ZEALAND JULY 1999 – JUNE 2002 
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It must be kept in mind that these dynamic effects could only exist to the extent that 
Telecom subsidised the free ISPs through the interconnection payments it had to pay to 
Clear, and that this had the adverse static efficiency effects already outlined.  
 
5.3 International comparison 
5.3.1 Australia 
Australia, in line with most other OECD countries, has been gradually liberalising its 
telecommunication industry. The Australian Government adopted a phased approach to 
the introduction of competition, with the establishment in 1991 of a duopoly to replace 
the former Government monopoly. Nowadays, Telstra and Optus are still the main 
telecommunication operators. They provide an unmetered telecommunication services, in 
that users pay a flat rate per local call irrespective of the duration. Interconnection 
charges for those calls are rather low, as indicated by the New Zealand Commerce 
Commission in setting the new interconnection price November 2002 for Telecom: “The 
final price […] clusters New Zealand with Australia and the United Kingdom”. Free ISPs 
were based on advertising revenues, but this model appeared to be non-sustainable in 
Australia. According to an Australian news source: “In theory the business model 
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allowed the service to subsidise the free access through advertising revenue. In practice 
the bottom fell out of online advertising, just as the services were getting off the ground, 
and data hungry Internet users were increasingly prepared to pay for services which better 
fed their habits”83. In addition to the global downturn (see Section 3.1.3), the two main 
problems faced by Australian free ISPs were Australia’s market size: “[…] a small 
advertising pool, in which only a few players are allowed to swim”84. 
 
5.3.2 United States  
In the United States, on the other hand, some free ISPs were able to survive the downturn 
in online advertising. Some credit the success of those few free ISPs in the US to their 
“[…] ability to achieve a critical mass through the countries 40 million homes and […] 
the luxury of lower bandwidth costs” 85. Many free ISPs went bankrupt or altered their 
business plans, however. Moreover, the few free ISPs that survived offered limited 
services that restricted the number of online hours, while charging a fee for longer or 
unlimited access. The biggest names to survive were NetZero and Juno, which combined 
in 2001 to form United Online (see Section 3.1.1). According to CNET news (2001), a 
study conducted by Telecommunications Reports International found that the number of 
US homes with Internet access dropped by 0.3 percent to 68.5 million during the first 
quarter of 2001. The decline was considered to be partly due to the shrinking number of 
free ISPs. The same study also reports a certain degree of substitution towards dial-up 
ISPs and cable modem services though.   
 
5.3.3 United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom has traditionally had a system of metered local calls in which ISPs 
generally buy the terminating part of the call from the terminating operator, who in turn 
buys the originating part of the call from the originating network operator (usually British 
Telecom)86. Subscription-free Internet services were enabled through terminating 
                                                          
83 ZDNet Australia (2002). 
84 Australia.internet.com (2000) 
85 Australia.internet.com (2000) 
86 Oftel (2001). 
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operators sharing their NTS revenues87 with ISPs, for similar reasons as in New Zealand 
(i.e., generating more traffic in order to obtain more NTS revenues). According to Oftel, 
the pioneer of this model (Freeserve) continues to be the market leader for UK residential 
and SME dial-up access88. Today, the subscription-free ISP model – based on sharing 
NTS revenues – still exists in the UK, although the Internet services market has matured 
and demand has shifted towards unmetered schemes89. The sharing of NTS revenues with 
ISPs allows terminating operators to compete based on the revenue share that they pass 
onto ISPs. In addition, some operators have expanded their product range beyond the 
simple termination of calls to include additional related services such as modem and 
server hosting and call management features90. Price competition among subscription-
free ISPs forced down Internet call charges, and the first partly unmetered ISP packages 
offered off-peak unmetered access via an 0800 number, but these were limited by time-
out periods and were available to only a limited number of subscribers. Unmetered access 
was the primary focus in 2000.  
 
5.3.4 General performance across countries 
In many countries, an important reason for the emergence of unmetered Internet access 
was the introduction of subscription-free ISPs, which forced down prices of Internet 
services, eventually resulting in the offering of unmetered Internet access packages. 
Referring to the 2001 OECD STI Scoreboard, the Australian National Office for the 
Information Economy (NOIE) states that countries which have unmetered local (Internet) 
calls are amongst the least expensive in terms of cost of Internet access (see Figure 5.11) 
and generally have the highest household Internet penetration levels (see Figure 5.12)91.  
 
 
                                                          
87 The term Number Translation Services ("NTS") describes a range of specially tariffed services, primarily 
used for telemarketing, which operate within the number ranges 080X/0500 (Freefone), 0345/0645/0845 
(local call fee access or LCFA), 0541/0870/0990 (national call fee access or NCFA) and 08xx/09xx 
(Premium Rate Services or PRS). These services are offered at specific price points in order that customers 
calling from any fixed network will be able to associate the number range with a particular pricing 
arrangement. Oftel (2001). 
88 Freeserve was acquired by the French ISP Wanadoo SA in January 2001. 
89 Oftel (2001). 
90 Ibid. 
91 NOIE (2002). 
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FIGURE 5.10 PRICE OF “ALWAYS ON” INTERNET ACCESS AT PEAK TIMES, AUG. 2001 
 
                                        
In US$ (PPP), including VAT 
Source: OECD (2001). 
 
FIGURE 5.11 PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS WITH INTERNET ACCESS AT HOME, SEPT. 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: N
 OIE / Nielsen// NetRatings (2001). 
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 However, the countries that have unmetered local calls do tend to have low broadband 
penetration rates (see Figure 5.8), suggesting that these unmetered dial-up packages (a 
likely result of the competitive pressures exerted by free ISP offerings) substitute for the 
adoption of broadband. According to Oftel (2001): “Analysts and market research widely 
predict that dial-up access will remain the dominant method of connecting to the Internet 
among residential consumer and small businesses for the foreseeable future”92. On an 
overall level, considering dial-up access prices, Internet access possibilities and 
broadband penetration rates, we can conclude that of the countries considered in the 
above analysis the United States performs best, New Zealand slightly better than 
Australia and all better than the United Kingdom. It should be noted, however, that all 
countries perform well in Internet penetration compared to OECD members that have 
metered local calls.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
92 However, Oftel has also argued that unmetered access is often a stepping stone to broadband.  
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6 CONCLUSION 
 
The New Zealand telecommunications experience illustrates the process of competition 
in a market for network services, characterised by technological change and minimal 
regulation. The story of free ISPs is one episode in the battle of Telecom and Clear for 
the New Zealand telecommunications market. It was enabled by a complex combination 
of regulation, contractual choices and an unanticipated surge of the Internet. Despite 
certain static inefficiencies, the free ISPs have brought a considerable number of dynamic 
efficiencies that should be taken into account when evaluating New Zealand’s light-
handed policy regime in this industry.  
 
Unlike ISPs in the United States and Australia, free ISPs in New Zealand were never 
based on advertising revenues. Rather, the New Zealand free ISPs emerged through the 
simultaneous emergence of the interconnection pricing scheme set out in the 1996 local 
call interconnection agreement (ICA) between Telecom and Clear, and the unanticipated, 
explosive growth of the Internet.  
 
Deregulation and growing use of telecommunications services in the early 1990s implied 
increased demand for interconnection among network operators: For this reason, and in 
the context of uncertainty arising from lack of information about the future in the face of 
rapidly changing technology, the main network operators entered into interconnection 
agreements. The five-year interconnection agreement signed between incumbent Telecom 
and entrant Clear in 1996 determined that the operators charged each other a certain sum 
per minute for terminating calls that originated on the other’s network. In New Zealand, 
the Kiwi Share Obligations require Telecom to offer free residential local calls. Given the 
historical pattern of ownership of the local loop, the bulk of local calls tend to originate 
on Telecom’s network and terminate on competing networks, mainly Clear’s. For this 
reason, it was agreed that Clear would pay Telecom more for each local call originated on 
Clear’s network terminated by Telecom than Telecom would pay Clear for local calls in 
the opposite direction.  
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Under this arrangement, the parties faced the risk that unforeseen future developments 
like new pricing regimes or technological change could cause the contract to turn out 
disadvantageous to them. Evans and Quiqley suggest that one way in which the parties 
would be able to reduce this risk was to breach the contract by credibly using a claimed 
violation of the 1986 Commerce Act93. Indeed, only five months after signing the 
agreement with Telecom, Clear attempted to renegotiate its terms. In February 1997, it 
began withholding ten percent of the amount due to Telecom in terms of the agreement. 
Before the High Court where Telecom’s application for payments to be made pending 
resolution of the Commerce Act challenge was denied, Clear claimed that Telecom’s 
discount regime was in violation of the Commerce Act. At the time, under New 
Zealand’s light-handed policy regime there was virtually sole reliance on – in this context 
largely untested - competition law, and it was generally not certain what contractual 
provisions constituted a breach of the Act and what behaviour is held to be anti-
competitive by the Courts. This light-handed regulation created legal uncertainty in the 
1996 interconnection agreement and may well have influenced Clear’s decision to breach 
the contract claiming a violation of competition law.  
 
During the ongoing dispute, an unanticipated surge of the Internet increased the number 
of one-way calls from mainly households to the network where ISPs were located. This 
situation created an arbitrage possibility to the benefit of Clear, because of the 
interconnection contract and the Kiwi Share regulation that prohibits local-call charging. 
By stimulating one-way traffic from the incumbent network to their networks, competing 
networks, mainly Clear, benefited from extra termination revenues. One option was for 
competing networks to convince ISPs to operate on their networks by offering them part 
of the additional termination revenues. Provided with these financial incentives, the ISPs 
stimulated the amount of one-way calls from households to the ISPs located on the 
competing networks, resulting in increasing termination revenues. This arbitrage led to 
the emergence of free ISPs in New Zealand, like I4free, Zfree, Freenet and others. The 
termination revenues received by the competing networks and assigned to ISPs 
encouraged a number of them to offer free Internet services, thereby attracting more 
                                                          
93 Evans and Quigley (2000). 
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customers, i.e. one-way calls. To illustrate, the revenues received by some free ISPs 
amounted to approximately NZ$500,000 per month94.  
 
It is important to note that such arbitrage possibilities could only exist for the time period 
covered by the contract. As soon as the interconnection contract ends and the incumbent 
is no longer required to pay termination fees to competing networks, the ISPs lose their 
main source of income and are consequently no longer able to offer free Internet services. 
However, in New Zealand, the heavily paying incumbent (Telecom) decided not to wait 
till the end of the contract, but instead created a special access package that provided 
strong financial incentives for ISPs to buy an access number of the incumbent within a 
certain number range (0867). That number range was then excluded from the interconnect 
termination payments regime, and all Internet calls were rerouted through Telecom’s 
Intelligent Network. Free ISP I4free attempted to use number porting, i.e., diverting calls 
through its 0867 number to Clear’s network to still be able to terminate Internet calls on 
that network and receive the associated interconnection payments from Telecom. 
However, its entry was effectively blocked by Telecom, arguing it had to cut off lines 
servicing I4free due to fears of exchange overload. I4free took the case to Court and a 
decision is yet to be made about the legality of aspects of Telecom’s actions. 
 
The outcome of the contract / regulatory arbitrage experience was the agreement to 
establish a bill-and-keep arrangement where neither Telco charged the other for calls 
terminated in its network. 
 
Looking at the value of free ISPs for New Zealand requires a comparison of static and 
dynamic efficiency effects. Allocative, static efficiency may have been affected in a 
number of ways. Firstly, excess demand in the ISP market due to Telecom ‘subsidising’ 
the difference between price and marginal cost is economically inefficient as resources 
are misallocated. Allocative efficiency may further be affected if competition in the 
Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) market, Telecom’s pricing, or the quality of 
its network was affected. The effect of transfers to competitors through the 
                                                          
94 Toddun, W., pers comm, 2002. 
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interconnection contract and associated free ISPs on competition and the performance of 
the PSTN market is very difficult to appraise as it involves detailed knowledge of costs, 
demand and strategies. We did observe increased competition in the PSTN market as 
more and more operators vigorously invested in the extension and improvement of their 
respective networks, eventually resulting in consolidation. Increased demand in the ISP 
market and the associated extra traffic could have affected prices, quality, and profits. 
The Kiwi Share Obligations limit price increases by Telecom, particularly in the area of 
local access and call usage. Its response was to install the 0867 access package for ISPs. 
There is very little evidence for reduced quality of Telecom services.  
 
Dynamic efficiency is represented by economically efficient performance over time in 
investment, innovation and consumption. Dynamic efficiency was affected in a number 
of ways during the development of free ISPs. First, the value of the Internet increased as 
the free ISPs attracted more users. This learning effect may have enhanced the uptake and 
development of electronic communication. However, market data from the relevant 
period do not show overwhelming evidence for this. At the same time, the free ISP 
development may have narrowed the so-called ‘digital divide’, by creating a lower price 
to all users to an extent that, together, these effects increased New Zealand’s Internet 
penetration rates. Indeed, judged on international comparisons, New Zealand penetration 
rates have been very high. Broadband uptake appears to be low in countries in which 
ISPs offer free Internet services, as customers tend to stick to low cost dial-up schemes. 
However, as people get more familiar with the Internet, demand for high-speed services 
may well increase in the near future. This may explain the (anticipating) increased 
competition and investment in the PSTN market to 2001. Free ISPs forced down prices 
for Internet services, which eventually led to the introduction of unmetered packages. It 
appears that performance in the ISP market, measured by price and Internet penetration, 
is better in countries with unmetered packages (often a consequence of the existence of 
free ISPs) like the United States, Australia and New Zealand, than in countries where 
only metered Internet services are offered.  
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Having analysed the development and implications of free ISPs in general and those in 
New Zealand in particular, we can conclude that they are a non-sustainable business 
model. Free ISPs in countries like Australia and the United States, based on advertising 
revenues, have appeared to be unprofitable. In New Zealand, free ISPs appeared to be 
merely an episode in the battle of the Telcos, enabled through an exogenous 
technological change in the face of light-handed regulation and a five-year 
interconnection agreement. Nevertheless, as our efficiency analysis has shown, free ISPs 
have clearly not been without impact.  
 
Policy interventions directed at interconnection negotiations and even prices are already 
taking place even in the most deregulated economies (including from 2001 in New 
Zealand). However, in evaluating telecommunications regulation, one should not 
underestimate the potential benefits of operators’ flexibility to react to exogenous 
changes and competition among even a very few players. As we have learned from the 
free ISP story, this flexibility may result in alterations in market structure and/or 
performance that cannot be anticipated, but that may nevertheless bring important 
dynamic efficiencies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 67
Appendix A95
 
Access charge: Wholesale price to be paid to a network by an interconnecting network 
for access to a segment of the former network. 
 
(A)DSL: (A)symmetric digital subscriber loop, technique allowing higher-speed access 
through the existing local loop by installing equipment on the premises and before the 
first switch. 
 
Bill-and-keep: Rule under which two local exchange networks do not charge each other 
for terminating off-net calls. 
 
Central office: (also called ‘end office’) First switch, usually located a few kilometers 
from the subscriber. 
 
CLEC: Competitive local exchange carrier. 
 
Efficient component pricing rule (ECPR): Rule for determining access prices by an 
integrated carrier, under which the access charge is equal to the loss in profit incurred on 
the competitive segment by the provider of access when it provides access to a rival. 
 
ILEC: Incumbent local exchange carrier. 
 
ISP: Internet service provider.  
 
Local loop: Connection between the subscriber’s premises and the end office. 
 
Number portability: Possibility for subscribers to keep the same phone number when 
they change the network to which they are connected. 
 
Off-net calls: Calls originating and terminating on different networks. 
 
PSTN: Public switched telephone network. 
 
Termination access charge: Access charge paid for the use of the network at the 
termination of a call (as opposed to ‘origination access charge’). 
 
 
                                                          
95 Definitions taken from Laffont and Tirole (2000). 
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Appendix B 
 
 
 
S. 27 (1) of the 1986 Commerce Act 
 
“[…] Contracts, arrangements, or understandings substantially lessening 
competition prohibited.  
No person shall enter into a contract or arrangement, or arrive at an understanding, 
containing a provision that has the purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, of 
substantially lessening competition in a market […]”. 
 
 
S. 36 (1) of the 1986 Commerce Act: 
 
“[…] No person who has a dominant position in a market shall use that position for 
the purpose of  
(a) Restricting the entry of any person into that or any other market; or 
(b) Preventing or deterring any person from engaging in competitive conduct in that 
or in any other market; or 
(c) Eliminating any person from that or any other market […]”. 
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Appendix C 
 
 
 
 
End user’s home connection, existing of a computer and a regular dial-
up telephone line. 
 
 
 
Central office; first switch, usually located a few kilometers from the 
subscriber. 
 
 
 
ISP switch  
 
 
 
ISP switch 
 
 
 
ISP modem bank 
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Appendix D 
 
Stage 0 (1991 - 1996): pre-commercialisation era; Clear / Telecom dispute; 
Interconnection agreement Clear and Telecom (May 1996). 
Stage 1 (mid-1996 – end 1997): Launch Xtra en ClearNet; Severe price 
competition among ISPs; IHug offers first flat rate service. 
Stage 2 (1998): Supply-side stability; Growing demand for Internet 
services. 
 
 
 
 
 
1991 – end 1999 
Stage 3 (1999): Increase in competition between ISPs; Declining Internet 
access prices; ClearNet and ParadiseNet introduce flat rate access. 
February: Compass Communications launches Freenet, 10 hours of free 
Internet Access, 10,000 new customers in first four weeks.  
April: i4free is launched, first truly free ISP. Telecom applies call controls 
on i4free traffic. Government announces Commerce Act will be 
strengthened. 
May: Telecom and Clear reach agreement on 0867 access package. 
July: Telecom and Telstra Saturn sign new interconnection agreement, key 
characteristics are bill&keep and callsink provisions. 
September: new wave of price decreases, Clear and Xtra announce flat rate 
of $24.95, following iHug.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2000 
October: Ministerial Inquiry into Telecommunications recommends 
industry-specific regulatory framework. Telecom and Clear sign new 
interconnection agreement, also including bill&keep and callsink 
provisions. Zfree reaches 250,000 registered users and has to suspend new 
registration to ensure quality. 
January: i4free tries to migrate users to pay service, it has reached 145,000 
subscribers by then.  
April: free ISP Splurge starts charging for its services. 
May: Freenet cuts back free Internet access offer to 3.5 hours per month 
and charges $14.75 per month after that. Telecommunications Bill is 
introduced in Parliament. 
December: Telecommunications Act is passed. 
 
 
 
 
 
2001 – mid 2002 
July 2002: Zfree ceases its business and redirects customers to Clearnet. 
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Appendix E 
 
NEW ZEALAND ADVERTISING INDUSTRY TURNOVER 
 
 
 
S
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 $M % $M % $M % $M % 
Newspapers 543 40.6 566 39.8 596 40.1 606 40.7
Television 473 35.4 487 34.3 501 33.7 479 32.2
Radio 170 12.7 178 12.6 190 12.8 196 13.2
Magazines 127 9.5 159 11.2 157 10.6 166 11.1
Outdoor 14 1.1 18 1.3 28 1.9 32 2.2
Cinemas 10 0.7 12 0.8 13 0.9 9 0.6
TOTAL 1337 100.0 1420 100.0 1485 100.0 1488 100.0
ource: Adapted from CAANZ (2002) 
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Appendix F 
 
In the model of Laffont et al (1998a), given income y and telephone consumption q, a 
consumer located at x and joining network i has utility 
 
y  +  v0  –  t | x – xi |  +  u(q) 
 
where v0 represents a fixed surplus from being connected to either network, t | x – xi | 
denotes the cost of being connected to a network with address xi (i = 1 , 2) different from 
the consumer’s address x, and the variable gross surplus, u(q).  
 
The total marginal costs of a call includes c0 at the originating and terminating ends of the 
call and c1 in between (covering for example switching costs or trunk lines): 
 
c  =  2c0  +  c1. 
 
The market shares of both networks are then determined by the point at which customers 
are indifferent between buying from network 1 or network 2, given the price plus 
transport costs. A consumer located at x = α is only indifferent between the two networks 
if 
 
    v(p1)  –  tα  =  v(p2)  –  t (1-α) 
or 
    α = α (p1 , p2) = ½ + σ [ v(p1) – v(p2) ] 
where 
    σ = 1 / 2t 
 
is an index of substitutability between the two networks. The two networks’ market 
shares are thus  α1 = α  and  α2 = 1 – α  (because full coverage is assumed). 
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Two-part tariffs yield pricing at the perceived marginal cost (including the effect of 
access charges). For firm i:  
 
C + αj (a – c0). 
 
The idea that in case of two-part tariffs, the intensity of competition does not depend on 
access charge a can be explained as follows96. Suppose that the access charge a is raised 
by δa. Each network’s marginal cost increases by δa/2, and so do usage fees. To keep net 
surplus and market share constant, a network must reduce its fixed fee by –δF = qδa/2. 
This lowers the gain from attracting a new customer by qδa/2. On the other hand, the 
increase in the access charge provides an additional incentive to attract a customer, as this 
saves an extra amount in access charges equal to qδa/2. The two effects cancel, and thus 
the intensity of competition does not vary with the access charge. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
96 Laffont et al (1998a). 
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Appendix G 
 
In the model of Haan (2001), demand for dial-up Internet access is given by   
 
    q  =  γ  -  p for  p ≥  0  
 
where q denotes the total demand per unit time and p the full price the consumer has to 
pay for one minute of dial-up Internet access (existing of the price of telephone 
connection (data traffic) and the price of Internet access as such, hence p = pT + pA) and 
where γ is an exogenous parameter. The respective profit functions for telephone firm T 
and service provider A are 
 
   πT  =  pT (γ – pT – pA) ,     πA  =  pA (γ – pT – pA)    
 
Maximising the latter yields  
     pA  =  (γ – pT) / 2  . 
 
Plugging this back into the profit function of firm T and maximizing with respect to p 
yields 
    pT  =  ½ γ ,      pA  =  ¼ γ  
 
and hence equilibrium profits are  
 
    πT  =  ⅛ γ² ,     πA  =  1/16 γ² . 
 
It is clear to see that a single monopolist controlling both markets would set p = ½ γ 
(which is lower than the total price of telephone connection and Internet access p = ¾ γ), 
yielding profits π = ¼ γ², which exceeds total profits of firms T and A in the above 
scenario. 
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According to Haan (2001), the optimal solution for firm T is to offer a lump-sum L to 
firm A conditional on A setting PA = 0. Total profits of T from offering this contract are 
then97  
 
    πT  =  pT (γ – pT)  -  [(γ – pT) / 2]²  . 
 
Maximising those profits with respect to pT and substituting that value in πT and πA yields 
 
  pT  =  3/5 γ , πT  =  1/5 γ²      and πA  =  1/25 γ²  .   
 
Compared to the situation without the contract depicted above, total profits have 
increased, firm A is worse off98, and Internet users are better off. Because the double 
marginalisation problem no longer exists, market inefficiencies have been reduced. 
 
When considering both the regular telephony market and the Internet access market 
(assuming regular telephony demand is not influenced by the demand for dial-up Internet 
access99), demand for dial-up Internet access services and demand for regular telephony 
are given by  
 
   q  =  γ  -  pT  -  pA and   Q  =  1 -  αpT   
 
respectively, with α denoting some parameter with α > 0. Suppose firm T can offer a 
take-it-or-leave-it contract to firm A, promising to pay it a lump sum L if and only if it 
sets pA. The possible strategies for T are now (1) offering a contract and serve both 
markets, (2) bypassing the Internet access market by setting pA so high that demand on 
that market is zero, or (3) offering a contract, but bypassing the regular telephony market 
by setting pT so high that demand on that market is zero. The result of Haan’s analysis is 
                                                          
97 Firm T needs to set its lump-sum L so that firm A will just accept it, which results in L = [(γ – pT) / 2]². 
98 Yet even though firm A is free to reject the contract of firm T, it appear to be in its best interest to accept.  
99 This assumption may be criticized on the ground that new communication methods that exist through the 
Internet (such as email and Internet telephony) may actually reduce demand for voice traffic through 
regular telephony. 
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that for high enough α, as γ increases, free Internet access (i.e., pA = 0) will initially be 
offered. Yet, as the Internet access market increases further, there is a point where firm T 
changes the terms of the contract offered to the service provider, and induces it to charge 
pA > 0. As γ increases yet further, offering free Internet access becomes again the most 
favourable option. But this final shift only occurs when the Internet market has grown so 
large that the market for regular telephony is no longer served. According to this analysis, 
free Internet may be a temporary phenomenon, depending on the values of parameters α 
and γ.  
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Appendix H
 
Quality service indicators for Telecom’s performance. 
 
Quality of Service 
Indicators 
(Residential telephone 
service requests = 
SRs) 
Oct 
95 
- 
Mar 
96 
Apr 
96 
- 
Sep 
96 
Oct
96 
- 
Mar
97 
Apr
97 
- 
Sep
97 
Oct
97 
- 
Mar
98 
Apr
98 
- 
Sep
98 
Oct
98 
- 
Mar
99 
Apr
99 
- 
Sep
99 
Oct 
99 
- 
Mar 
00 
Apr 
00 
- 
Sep 
00 
Oct
00 
- 
Mar
01 
Percentage of SRs that 
meet requested 
installation time 
94 93.3 90.8 90.1 87.7 89.3 93.6 89.6 88.2 88.5 87.6 
Percentage of "intact" 
SRs completed within 
24 hours of request 
96 95.8 95.5 96.8 96.9 96.4 97.2 97.8 98.3 98.8 99.2 
Percentage of "intact" 
SRs not completed 
within 48 hours of 
request 
0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.2 
Percentage of SRs 
outstanding 96 hours 
after requested time 
0.7 1.0 1.5 1.7 1.5 0.9 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.2 
Faults per 100 
residential circuit ends 
41 46 41.4 43.8 41.3 46 40 39.5 24.3 19.3 30.7 
Percentage of repair 
commitments that meet 
the customer's request 
78 80 80 80 82 84 91.3 92.7 93.8 91.5 92.0 
Percentage of faults 
cleared within 24 hours
60 54 60 59 67 70 79.2 79.5 85.8 82.2 85.7 
Percentage of faults 
outstanding after 96 
hours 
3 7.1 3.3 4.9 2.9 2.7 1.3 2.0 1.2 2.1 1.8 
Call minutes lost in 
electronic exchange 
outages (thousands) 
52 27 12 211 54 656 400 398 424 87 160 
Number of written 
residential escalated 
complaints 
649 1130 951 982 1063 1168 771 907 201 127 153 
The percentage of 
(correct residential 
telephone white page 
listings / total listings) 
99.96 99.95 99.95 99.97 99.94 99.98 99.85 99.91 99.89 99.93 99.93
Number of party-lines 960 808 661 258 251 228 203 200 197 197 194 
Average directory 
assistance answering 
time (seconds) 
10.6 10.5 20 11.1 6.7 4.8 8 7.2 7.7 6.4 7.7 
Average time taken to 
handle directory 
33 33 32 31 29 28 32.5 34 29.5 29.2 28.8 
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assistance calls 
(seconds); 
Availability of 
electronic payphones 
(%) 
98 97.7 97.9 98.4 98.2 98.6 98.7 98.8 99.4 99.4 99.4 
Local calls lost as 
percentage of total calls 
                0.14 0.12 0.18 
0876 calls lost as 
percentage of 0867 
calls 
                0.14 0.12 0.18 
 
Source: Ministry of Economic Development (2001) 
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